SOME

# ENQUIRIES,

Chiefly relating to

## SPIRITUAL BEINGS:

In which the

## Opinions of Mr. *HOBBES*,

With Regard to

## SENSATION,

## IMMATERIAL SUBSTANCE,

AND THE

## *Attributes* of the *Deity*,

Are taken Notice of.

And wherein likewiſe is examined, how far the Suppoſition of an

## INVISIBLE TEMPTER,

Is defenſible on the

Principles of NATURAL REASON.

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In Four DIALOGUES.

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Τὸν θεὸν, ὄντατε σοφώτατον, βουλομενόντ' ἐπιμελεῖσθαι καὶ δυνάμενον. Plat. de Legg. L. 10.

Ψυχὴ ἂν εἴη, πρὸς τῷ ἀθάνατος εἶναι, καὶ ἀνώλεθρος. Idem in Phædone.

Δαίμων κακὸς τρέπων πρὸς ἀδικίαν. Zaleuc. apud Stobæum.

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MVSEVM
BRITAN
NICVM

9 L i

THE

# PREFACE.

*IF the two firſt of the following Dialogues ſhould give a Reader, who has not been converſant in this Kind of Studies, ſome intelligible Notion concerning* material *and* immaterial *Subſtances; the* Senſations *of the Soul; and what ought to be underſtood by the* Wiſdom, Juſtice, *and* Goodneſs *of God, ----- the chief Intention of thoſe Dialogues is fully anſwer'd.*

*In the Third, the Opinion of the* Magi, *with reſpect to their two* Principles, *is conſider'd: as alſo the ancient Notion of* Tutelary *Deities; and* Plutarch's *Account of what appear'd to* Brutus.

*In the laſt, there is an Attempt to ſhew, how far the Influence of an* Inviſible *Evil Being may be admitted, without any* impious *or* abſurd *Conſequences.*

*The Reader will often find Mr.* Hobbes *mention'd; as well as a learn'd Foreigner.*

*It was evidently the great Misfortune of the firſt, to be perpetually making a bad Uſe of fine Abilities.*

*As*

*As to the latter, it was one plain Deſign of his Writings * to diſcredit ſeveral legendary Stories: and conſequently ſuch Deſign was highly commendable. The Work, for this Reaſon, is call'd by a great Author, "One "of the ſtrongeſt Books, he had read "upon this Subject" †.*

*However, as it ſometimes may happen to wiſe and good Men, to run into one Extream, whilſt they are avoiding another: ſo the judicious Reader muſt determine, how far this was really the Caſe of that Gentleman. And withal, whether his Reaſonings are, every where, ſtrictly concluſive.*

* *Le Monde enchanté* of Dr. *Balthaſar Bekker.*

† Remarks upon a Diſcourſe of *Free-Thinking*, § 16. By *Philelutherus Lipſienſis.*

P. S.

P. S. *The Book was wrote originally in* Dutch; *but translated into* French *by the Author's own Directions: and it is this Version, which is here made use of.*

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*ERRATA.*

| Pag. | Line | |
|---|---|---|
| 4 | *ult.* | in the Notes add p. 196, 197. |
| 31 | 10 | in the Notes, for *unoriginal*, read *unoriginated*. |
| 33 | 17 | for *Enquiries*, read *Enquirers*. |
| 42 | 13 | in the Notes, for ἐυδαιμονιωτάτη, read ἐυδαιμονικωτάτη. |
| 47 | 1 | for *was*, read *has*. |
| 50 | *ult.* | for *whoever*, read *who ever*. |
| 60 | *ult.* | for *refers*, read *prefers*. |
| 63 | 1 | in the Notes, for *Persons*, read *Persans*. |
| 76 | 9 | for *and you*, read *and yet you*. |
| 78 | 4 | in the Notes, for παρέδι read πατρίδι. |
| 79 | 8 | in the Notes, for ἀρετήν, read ἀρεστήν. |

SOME

# SOME ENQUIRIES, &c.

## DIALOGUE I.

### *CEBES* and *PHÆDO.*

*C.* MY good Friend, I hope I have now found the Opportunity, which I have often wiſh'd for; and that is, of examining a little more minutely into thoſe Subjects that we juſt touch'd upon, when laſt together.

*P.* It wou'd be a Misfortune, my Friend, ever to want Leiſure for converſing with an ingenious and worthy Man.

*C.* I know you think kindly of thoſe who mean well: And indeed an honeſt and good Meaning is all that I pretend to. I muſt own however, that I am not over forward to take

Things upon Truſt; and therefore if you find me either ſlow in aſſenting, or ſometimes even taking Part with all the *different Sects* of Philoſophers, I beg you will only aſcribe it to a Deſire of finding out the Truth.

*P.* So we can but arrive at the Truth, it is no Matter how many Philoſophers help us to it.

*C.* Well then, without any further Apology, I wou'd firſt take Notice, that amidſt the various Sentiments of the Learned, a Man is often at a Loſs, how to determine himſelf. Suppoſe, for Example, a Perſon wou'd be ſatisfied about *Subſtance*, either *material* or *immaterial*. One Philoſopher will tell him, that *all* is Matter: And a Second will aſſure him, there is *no* Matter at all. A Third will maintain, that *Subſtance* is ſomething *real*, and *neceſſary* to the Support of *Accidents*, or *Properties:* Whilſt a Fourth, though he admits the *Reality* of *Subſtance*, yet affirms that *Properties* may ſubſiſt without it. And again, others there are, who, notwithſtanding they agree with this Man, that *Properties*, as they are commonly call'd, may ſubſiſt alone; yet thus far differ, that they ſuppoſe what is uſually call'd *Subſtance*, is nothing more than a mere *Idea* of the Mind.

Pray

Pray what is a Man to do, amidſt ſuch Variety of Opinions?

*P.* Only to cloſe in with that, which, after due Examination, appears the moſt reaſonable.

*C.* Thus far we certainly agree. But what ſay you, my Friend, to a Doubt I have entertained in reſpect of *Subſtance*? And that is, whether it may not be deſtroy'd, whilſt the *Accidents* remain juſt as they were? You find I take *Subſtance*, according to the uſual Meaning of it, for that which is *diſtinct* from the *Properties*; and which *ſupports* them, when they are together.

*P.* I perfectly underſtand you, *Cebes*. You are in Doubt, whether your Snuff-Box, for Inſtance, may not ſtill remain a Snuff-Box, as to all external Appearances, after the *Subſtance* is gone. That is, whether it will not convey the ſame *Colour* to the Eye; make the ſame *Reſiſtance* to the Touch; and ſeem exactly of the ſame *Dimenſions*. So that, in ſhort, no Difference can be found, after the ſtricteſt Examination of the Senſes.

*C.* That is the very Caſe, *Phædo*. And how whimſical a Suppoſition ſoever it may appear, no leſs a Man than the great *Bellarmine* maintains it. He affirms to the following

lowing Effect, that " *Accidents* may exiſt " without any *Subject*; and that it is not eſ- " ſential for them to inhere in one." * His *Religion* I acknowledge was very *bad*; but that won't hinder his *Metaphyſicks* from being entirely *good*.

*P.* Moſt certainly, my Friend, it will not. But there are moreover much greater Authorities to this Purpoſe, than that of the learned Cardinal. Let us therefore hear, what is declared by a Decree of the *Council* of *Trent*, and publiſh'd by the Command of *Pius* V. — " † There are three Things *truly wonderful* " in the Sacrament of the *Euchariſt*, which the " Catholic Faith firmly believes and confeſſes " to be brought about by the Words of *Con-* " *ſecration*. The firſt is, that the *true Body* " of *Chriſt*, the very *ſame* which was born

* De Sacrament. Euchariſt. l. 3. c. 24.

† Tria enim ſunt maximè admiranda, atque ſuſcipienda, [*lege* ſuſpicienda] quæ in hoc Sacramento Verbis Conſecrationis effici Fides Catholica ſine ullâ dubitatione credit, & confitetur. Primum eſt, Verum Chriſti Domini Corpus, illud idem, quod natum ex Virgine, in Cœlis ſedet ad Dexteram Patris, hoc Sacramento contineri. Alterum eſt, nullam in eo Elementorum Subſtantiam remanere; quamvis nihil à Senſibus magis alienum, & remotum videri poſſit. Tertium eſt, ——— Accidentia, quæ aut Oculis cernuntur, aut aliis Senſibus percipiuntur, ſine ullâ re ſubjectâ eſſe, mirâ quâdam, atque inexplicabili ratione. ——— Nulli Subſtantiæ inhærent; ſed per ſe ipſa conſtant ——— *Catechiſmus ex Decreto Sacroſancti Concilii Tridentini, Juſſu Pii Quinti Pontificis Max. Editus, Venetiis*, 1678. *apud Benedictum Milochum, Superiorum Permiſſu. p. 196, 197.*

" of

" of the Virgin, and *ſits* at the right Hand " of the Father in Heaven, is *contain'd* in " this Sacrament. The ſecond is, that *no* " *Subſtance* of the Elements remains in it; " tho' nothing may ſeem more *contrary* to the " *Senſes.* And the Third is, that the *Acci-* " *dents* which are diſcern'd by the Eye, or any " other of the Senſes, remain there by them- " ſelves, in a *wonderful* and *inexplicable* Man- " ner, without any *Subject* or *Subſtance* to in- " here in."

'Tis true, ſome may inſinuate, in order to diſgrace theſe *profound* Metaphyſics, that they were altogether unknown till the Days of *Tranſubſtantiation.* But even admitting this; and allowing, that all Philoſophers did before eſteem it a *Contradiction*, for an *Accident* or *Property* to exiſt ſeparate from a *Subject*, as a learned *Jeſuit* * pretends in Oppoſition to *Bellarmine:* Yet it ought to be conſider'd, that many *curious* and *uſeful Inventions* have been the ſole Product of latter Ages.

Indeed there is one Inconveniency that may attend theſe Metaphyſics, with reſpect to ſome particular Conſtitutions. For if a Philoſopher in this Way of thinking, who had but *weak Nerves*, ſhould fancy he was nothing but a

* Fonſeca Com. in 7 Metaph. c. 2. q. 1. ſ. 2.

mere

mere Collection of *Properties*, without one Grain of *Subſtance* belonging to him; no one wou'd anſwer for the Conſequences of ſuch a Deluſion. And therefore I ſhould think theſe metaphyſical Notions to be chiefly proper for thoſe *Southern Climates*, which enjoy a much warmer Sun than we can boaſt of.

*C.* I take it for granted, that you have ſome other Objection to theſe Metaphyſics, than merely their ill Effects upon a vapouriſh Conſtitution.

*P.* Pray, my good Friend, do's not the *Subſtance* of that Cane of yours, conſiſt of *ſolid* and *extended* Parts?

*C.* What follows from hence?

*P.* I would be glad to know, what is become of theſe *ſolid* and *extended* Parts, when the *Subſtance* is gone?

If they accompany one another, as may reaſonably be preſumed; what is there left behind, which is either *ſolid* or *extended?* Here is certainly nothing left: not ſo much as a mere *Ideal* Cane. For a Cane in *Idea*, without *Extenſion*; or *Extenſion*, where nothing is *extended*, are only conceivable by Thoſe, who are never at a loſs, to conceive any thing. But farther, with Regard to the Secondary Qualities of Bodies, ſuch as *Taſts*, *Scents* and *Colours*,

*Colours.* What are theſe, as conſidered in the Bodies themſelves? Are they any thing more than a Power reſulting from the particular Conſtitution of the Parts of Body, to excite thoſe *Senſations* in us?

*C.* I ſuppoſe they are nothing more.

*P.* But again, what may be the Reaſon, that Coral, before reduced to a Powder, is *red*; but afterwards it appears to be *white?*

*C.* It is owing to the Figure and Texture of its Parts being alter'd; by which Means, the Rays of Light are differently reflected, from what they were before.

*P.* Colours then will generally appear to us, according to the different State of the Parts of Bodies; and as the Light happens to be reflected back to the Eye?

*C.* They will ſo.

*P.* Hence it is then, that *This* Piece of Coral is *red*, and *That* Heap is *white?*

*C.* Undoubtedly.

*P.* Let us now ſuppoſe, that the *Subſtance* of both is withdrawn; but the *Colours* remain. Pray what may this Difference of *Colours* be owing to? Not, I hope, to the different *Figure* and *Texture* of their Parts: for theſe ſeem to be vaniſhed with the *Subſtance.* Unleſs it can be proved by the ſame *Metaphyſics*, (and what is it, my worthy Friend,

Friend, which *cannot* be proved by them?) that *when the Subſtance is flown, the Parts are always left behind!*

*C.* Well, ſince we meet with ſo many Difficulties, in ſeparating the *Subſtance* from its *Properties*, let 'em by all Means, keep together.

But now, by what Method ſhall I be able to frame a juſt and clear *Idea* of ſuch a *Subſtance*, as is called *immaterial?*

*P.* Only by turning the Eyes of the Mind upon itſelf, and viewing its various Faculties and Operations. From hence may a Man frame as perfect an *Idea* of an *immaterial* Subſtance *, as he can of a *material* One, by viewing the groſſeſt Body in Nature.

*C.* Wherever then *Thinking* and *Willing*, and a Power of *Self-Motion* are to be met with, muſt I immediately conclude, there is an *Immaterial* Principle?

*P.* The Concluſion, *Cebes*, would be perfectly juſt. For *Matter* is demonſtrably *inactive* and *lifeleſs.*

*C.* And yet this *dull* and *dead* Matter, as you are pleaſed to ſuppoſe it, is not only capable of becoming, merely by the Operation of other Bodies upon it, ſo very *active* and *volatile*

* See *Locke's* Hum. Und. B. 2. c. 23. ſ. 15.

as even to *fly* away from us; and ſometimes ſo *powerful*, as to quicken Men that are half dead themſelves; but is able to ſhake the Earth almoſt to the very Center.

*P.* You don't ſurely imagine, when *Matter* is called *inactive* and *lifeleſs*, that it is thereby pronounced incapable of having *Motion* communicated, or even a Principle of *Life* united to it.

Nothing more is meant by theſe Terms, but only that neither *Motion* nor *Life* are *eſſential* to *Matter*. That no *vital* Power can ever ariſe from any Alteration the Parts of *Matter* can undergo: and that, when once it is at Reſt, it muſt remain in that State for ever, unleſs put in Motion by ſomething elſe.

But ſuppoſe for once, that all *Matter* was in perpetual *Motion*. Suppoſe it anſwered, in every Reſpect, to the famous *Fourth Principle* of *Lucretius*; in being as *ſubtil* and *moveable*, and conſiſting of as *ſmall* and *ſmooth* Particles, as the moſt lively Imagination can apprehend it; yet what has all this to do with *Senſe* or *Perception?* What likeneſs or reſemblance between them? That Philoſopher need not have diſcarded either *Heat*, or *Wind* or *Air*, from being Principles of *Senſation*, in order to introduce the other. For unleſs there

was ſome peculiar *Energy*, in its having *No Name*, the reſt bid full as fair as This, for *enliv'ning* a dull heavy Maſs, and rendering it *ſenſible* and *perceptive* *.

And as to all the amazing Effects which may be produced by the Operation of Bodies, here is evidently nothing more than mere *Matter* and *Motion*. But when once it can be ſhewn, that a *living*, *intelligent*, and *ſelf-determining* Principle can be extracted from *Matter*, or any Compound of it, the *Immaterialiſts* muſt certainly be routed.

*C.* You will allow that the Scent of a Roſe, and the Heat of Fire, are nothing in the Bodies themſelves, but the particular Motion of their ſmaller Parts?

*P.* What can be inferred from hence?

*C.* I would infer, that ſince "*Motion* can "only produce *Motion*, Theſe *ſenſible Quali-*

* Tenuis enim quædam moribundos deſerit Aura,
Miſta vapore; vapor porrò trahit aëra ſecum;
Nec calor is quiſquam, cui non ſit miſtus & aër.
L. 3. ℣. 233 ad 235.

Nec tamen hæc ſat ſunt ad ſenſum cuncta creandum:
Nil horum quoniam recipit Mens poſſe creare
Senſiferos Motus, quædam qui mente volutent.
Quarta quoque his igitur quædam natura neceſſe'ſt
Attribuatur; (ea'ſt omnino *NOMINIS EXPERS*:)
Quâ neque mobilius quicquam; neque tenuius extat;
Nec magis è parvis, aut lævibus ex Elementis;
Senſiferos Motus quæ didit prima per Artus.
℣. 239 ad 246.

"*ties*

" *ties*, as Mr. *Hobbes* maintains, can be no-
" thing elſe in us beſides ſo many different
" *Motions*."* And conſequently that *Motion*, and *Perception*, are only different Names for the ſame Thing.

*P.* Let us then ſay, that a Roſe is *ſenſible* of its own Fragancy; and a Fire of its own Heat: Or elſe, let us roundly maintain, that we ourſelves are *ſenſible* of *neither*. For if our *Perceptions* are nothing but ſo many various *Motions*; and the *Motions* of the Parts of Body, the ſame with *Perceptions*, one or the other muſt evidently follow. Eſpecially if you ſuppoſe, as you ſeem to do, that no *Matter* whatever is altogether *inanimate*.

But would it not be more *Philoſophical*, to ſay, that theſe Motions in Bodies *without* us, are capable of exciting Others *within* us; and that Theſe occaſion variety of *Perceptions*: which *Perceptions* are themſelves the immediate *Affection* or *Property* of ſome certain Principle, widely different and diſtinct from Body?

*C.* Tell me, *Phædo*. When Objects affect us from without, is it not by the different

* Neque in nobis aliud ſunt [*Qualitates omnes ſenſibiles*] quàm diverſi Motus. Motus enim nihil generat præter motum. —— *Leviath.* c. 1.

Motion of their Parts, that they excite certain *Ideas* or *Phantaſms* in us?

*P.* What follows?

*C.* Are not Theſe occaſioned, as Mr. *Hobbes* affirms "by the Preſſure of outward Objects, "and Counter-preſſure of the Organs *? By "the Motion from without being continued on "by the Nerves and Membranes, to the Brain "and Heart; from whence ariſes a Reſiſtance "or Counter-preſſure of the Laſt: and which "Motion by its tending outwards, appears as "if it was ſomething without the Organ" †.

*P.* And what of all This, my good Friend?

*C.* But are not theſe *Phantaſms*, or *Appearances*, as that Philoſoper maintains, the very *Senſations*, or Acts of *Senſation* itſelf **?

* ——— Motui ab Objecto——— fit aliqua totius Organi reſiſtentia ſive reactio——— ex eâ reactione aliquandiu durante, ipſum——— Phantaſma. *De Senſione et Motu Animali.*

† Objectum——— premendo, (mediantibus Nervis et Membranis) continuum efficit motum introrſum ad Cerebrum & inde ad Cor; unde naſcitur Cordis reſiſtentia & contra-preſſio ſeu ἀντιπερίστασις, ſive conatus Cordis liberantis ſe à preſſione per Motum tendentem extrorſum; qui Motus propterea apparet tanquam aliquid externum.——— *Leviath.* c. 1.

** Apparitio hæc, ſive Phantaſma, eſt id quod vocamus *Senſionem*. Ibid.——— Phantaſma eſt ſentiendi Actus.——— *De Senſione & Motu Animali.*

*P.* When

*P.* When the Rays of Light are reflected from any Object, and paſs thro' the different Coats and Humours of the Eye, is there not painted on the Bottom of it, by Means of the *Action* and *Re-action* of the Rays and Organ, a certain Picture or Image of ſuch Object?

*C.* There is ſo.

*P.* But ſhall we ſay, that ſuch Picture or Image *diſcerns* or *perceives* itſelf? If it does not, how can that very *Phantaſm* or *Appearance* be the very *Senſation*, or Act of *Senſation* itſelf? Muſt they not be juſt as different, as the *Picture* of Things is different from the *ſeeing* of them: Or as a Clap of Thunder from the *Senſe* of Hearing?

It is really wonderful, *Cebes*, how a Philoſopher could thus confound the different *Objects* and *Cauſes* of Senſation with the very *Senſe* itſelf!

*C.* However, with Regard to the abſolute *lifeleſsneſs* of Matter, I am ſtill an Enemy to it; being inclined to think that all Nature is *animated.* And therefore I was pleaſed to find, "that ſome *learned Philoſophers* had "actually maintain'd that *all Bodies are en-* "*dued with Senſe.* Though Mr. *Hobbes* is of "Opinion, that for want of the *proper Organs* "of Animals, whatever *Idea* might ariſe from the

" the *Re-action* of other Bodies, ſuch *Idea* or " *Phantaſm*, would immediately ceaſe, upon " the removal of the Object; and therefore " theſe [ſuppoſed *inanimate*] Bodies wou'd " only ſo *perceive* or be *ſenſible*, as never to " remember their own *Perceptions*. And " therefore he thinks ſome kind of *Me-* " *mory* neceſſary to what is commonly call'd " *Senſation:* and likewiſe that there ought to " be a *perpetual Variety* of *Phantaſms*, to " conſtitute That *Senſation*, which is ſtrictly " and properly *ſuch*; that ſo one Object may " be diſtinguiſhed from another. For he af- " firms, that to have always the *ſame* Senſa- " tion, and to have *no* Senſation at all, is One " and the ſame Thing".* Hence appears the " wide Difference between *Our* Senſations, and Thoſe of *Unorganized* Bodies. And hence ſuch Philoſophers, as tell us, *it would grieve a good-natured Man, to think he gave Pain to*

* Scio fuiſſe Philoſophos quoſdam, eoſdemque Viros doctos qui Corpora omnia Senſu prædita eſſe ſuſtinuerunt.——— Sed etſi ex re-actione etiam Corporum aliorum, Phantaſma aliquod naſceretur; illud tamen, remoto Objecto, ſtatim ceſſaret. Nam niſi ad retinendum Motum impreſſum, etiam remoto Objecto, apta habeant Organa, ut habent Animalia; ita tantùm ſentient, ut nunquam ſenſiſſe ſe recordentur.—— Senſioni ergo, quæ Vulgò ita appellatur, neceſſariò adhæret memoria aliqua.—— Senſioni adhæret propriè dictæ, ut ei aliqua inſita ſit perpetua Phantaſmatum varietas; ita ut aliud ab alio diſcerni poſſit.—— *Sentire ſemper idem, & non ſentire*, ad idem recidunt.——— *Phyſic.* c. 25. § 5.

*every*

*every part of Matter, which he trod upon,* may ſee their Objection is entirely groundleſs.

*P.* I queſtion extremely, whether this *Salvo* of Mr. *Hobbes* will prove at all ſatisfactory to thoſe Philoſophers. For let us ſuppoſe a Man to have the ſame *invariable* Senſation of Pain, both as to Kind and Degree, for the Space of one Hour; and to forget the Whole, as ſoon as that Hour is gone; can either the *Invariableneſs* of the Senſation, or the Want of *Memory* afterwards, prevent the Man from having *had*, at that Time, a *proper Senſation* of Pain?

Perhaps indeed, when They come to reflect, that This Man has *Organs*, which Mr. *Hobbes* does not allow to *All* Bodies; They may ſtill hope that the Anguiſh of an *Oak* or a *Foot-Ball*, can be but ſeldom *inſupportable*.

But now, my good Friend, let us imagine ſome Philoſopher to maintain, " that every " Heap of Flints and Pebbles have not only " *Senſe*, but *proper Organs*; that They do not " only receive *various Ideas*, but have alſo " *real Memory*. In ſhort, that every Mountain " and River in the Univerſe, are *organized* " Bodies; and that our fancying the contrary, " proceeds from downright Ignorance, and " nothing elſe. But becauſe we can't diſcover " the *ſame Organs*, as we do in other Crea-

" tures,

" tures, that therefore we haſtily conclude,
" They have *No Organs* at all; no *Diverſity*
" of *Senſations*, nor any *Remembrance* of 'em.
" However, that ſince Nature is not confined
" to one ſingle Pattern; ſhe may have diſ-
" penſed a Variety both of *inward* and *out-*
" *ward* Organs; of whoſe Shape and Form
" we having no *Ideas*, we may frequently
" ſee them, and yet neither know what They
" are, nor the Uſes they are deſign'd for. Nay,
" even with Regard to Diſcourſe, that They
" actually converſe with One Another; tho'
" the greateſt *Linguiſts* hitherto have not been
" able to ſettle their *Alphabet*, nor to under-
" ſtand their *Language*."

If ſome *Philoſopher*, *Cebes*, ſhould *affirm* all This, cou'd you really believe him to be *ſerious*? Or upon a Suppoſition, that he actually was; wou'd You not ſuſpect, that in ſearching after the *Underſtanding* of Rocks and Rivers, he had greatly impair'd, if not entirely loſt, his Own?

It muſt indeed be acknowledged, that this Perſon has *improved* upon the other *Hypotheſis*; but when once a *learned Philoſopher* ſhall take it into his Head, that a Block of Marble *feels* the *Chizel* or the *Saw*; we need not be ſurpriſed, if he advances a Step farther, and imagines

gines that it *remembers* the Injury, and *vows* Revenge.

*C.* But yet, my Friend, it is certain that Mr. *Hobbes*, whoſe Abilities are confeſs'd on all Hands, frankly declares, that " *if the Na-* " *ture of Senſation be placed in re-action only,* " *he do's not ſee, how thoſe learned Men can* " *poſſibly be refuted.*"*

*P.* Nor I neither truly, *Cebes.* For if *Senſation* actually conſiſts in *re-action alone*, is it in the Power of Man to *plow* or *harrow* a Field, without exciting *Senſations* in it? And when once *Senſations* are excited in the *Clods* of Earth; what Philoſopher, in his Wits, will deny, that Theſe *Clods* are *ſenſible?* So that it is only allowing a *ſmall poſtulatum*, and the reſt follows of Courſe.

But really, my Friend, ſuch kind of Philoſophy ſhou'd always *beg* the Aſſiſtance of the *Muſes. Lucretius* certainly knew what he did, when he ſet forth the wonderful Power of *Atoms*, in harmonious Numbers. He judged perfectly right, when he ſuppoſed that ſuch Philoſophy wanted all the *Attractives*, which Poetry cou'd give it†.

* Nec video, ſi natura Senſionis in re-actione ſola collocaretur, quomodo refutari poſſint. Ibid.

† ——— Volui tibi ſuaviloquenti
Carmine Pierio rationem exponere noſtram,
Et quaſi Muſæo dulci contingere Melle,

Nor can I help differing from a very learned Man, who makes a Doubt, which to admire moſt in *Lucretius*, whether the *Philoſopher*, or the *Poet* *. Beſides, the *Philoſopher*, in my humble Opinion, was ſo far from keeping the *Poet* from *trifling*, as that Gentleman contends,† that the *Poet*, on the contrary, only help'd the *Philoſopher* to *trifle* the more *agreeably*.

*C.* Well, *Phædo*, ſince you are ſo very Nice, that you can't reliſh the Doctrine of theſe Philoſophers, in mere Proſe; what ſay You to the following Sentiment of Mr. *Hobbes?* He acknowledges that Men were anciently poſſeſs'd of an Opinion, that the Soul was a *diſtinct Subſtance* from the Body; but he aſcribes it to the *Contagion* of the *Greek Dæmonology*.**

*P.* That the Opinion was certainly *ancient*, can admit of little Diſpute; nor will it admit of any, that Mr. *Hobbes* was no great Admirer of it. But that he has rightly traced its Original, is not altogether ſo clear.

Many of the beſt and wiſeſt of the Ancients

Si tibi fortè Animum tali ratione tenere
Verſibus in noſtris poſſem. L. 1. ℣. 944, &c.

* *Mattaire*'s Epiſtle Dedicatory before his Edition of *Lucretius*.
† Ibid.
** *Leviath.* p. 340.

believed

believed the Soul to be a *ſpiritual* and *immortal* Being *. And This they evidently did, from contemplating the Operations of their own Minds.

*C.* But Mr. *Hobbes* takes Notice, that the Men, " who held the Soul to ſubſiſt by vir-" tue of its own Nature, did not acknow-" ledge therein, any ſupernatural Gift of God."†

*P.* Admitting that all theſe Men were unanimous, in ſuppoſing the Soul independent of the Deity; yet what Connection is there, between ſo abſurd and extravagant an Opinion, and believing the Soul to be a *Subſtance diſtinct* from the Body; and capable of ſubſiſting in a State of Separation?

*C.* And what is an *immaterial Subſtance* to do in ſuch a State? For I am not able to apprehend, that it can ever *move* itſelf, or *change* its Place.

*P.* What ſhou'd hinder?

*C.* " Can *Motion* and *Place* be intelligible " of *Subſtances incorporeal*, or of any Thing, " but Bodies" ?**

* Plat. in Phæd. Idem. de Rep. l. x. de Leg. l. 12. Ariſtot. de Animâ l. 2. c. 1. Xenoph. Cyrop. l. 8. Cic. Acad. Qu. l. 4. Tuſcul. l. 1. Idem de Senect. & in Som. Scip. Plut. de Placit. Philoſ. l. 4. c. 2.

† *Leviath.* p. 340.

** *Idem*, Part 3. c. 34. p. 208.

*P.* If the Soul be allow'd to be an *incorporeal* Subſtance, I ſhou'd take it to be an *active*, and *ſelf-moving* Principle; and ſhou'd therefore as ſoon doubt of its *Exiſtence*, as whether *Motion* belong'd to it. Nor am I able to conceive, but it muſt exiſt ſome *Where*, or in ſome *Place*. And what ſhou'd prevent its *moving* from either, I ſee not. They who have made a *Diſtinction* between theſe two, ſeem to have done it, without much Neceſſity. And thoſe Gentlemen, who equally deny both to ſuch Beings, are to me quite unintelligible.*

*C.* However, Mr. *Hobbes* affirms that the Suppoſition of an *incorporeal* Soul, is attended with this Abſurdity. "For we muſt believe "that *All* of it is in the little Finger, and *All* "of it in every other Part"†.

*P.* Why is the Belief of an *immaterial* Soul to be charged with all this *Nonſenſe*?

*C.* Do's not the late learn'd Dr. *Clarke* himſelf maintain, that "the Soul can neither "*act*, or be *acted* upon, where it is not pre-"ſent"?**

* See a ſecond *Vindicat.* of Mr. *Locke*, p. 112,---115.
† *Leviath.* p. 373.
** His ſecond Reply to *Leibnitz*, ſ. 4.

*P.* And

*P.* And do's he not likewiſe maintain, that " the Soul is not *omnipreſent* to every Part " of the Body, and therefore do's not, and " cannot *itſelf* actually operate upon every " Part of the Body, but only upon the Brain, " or certain Nerves and Spirits, which, by " Laws and Communications of God's ap- " pointing, influence the whole Body ?"*

So that he do's not ſuppoſe the Soul to be in *every* Joint or Limb affected; but, as he had before expreſſed it, *in it's proper Senſory*†. Though *how* the Soul ſees the Images, to which it is *preſent*, he obſerves, " We know not."**

*C.* Thſe Suppoſitions then, you imagine, will render the Preſence of the Soul unneceſſary, in order to Senſation; tho' it can neither *act*, nor be *acted* upon, where it is not *preſent?*

*P.* I think nothing is more intelligible or conſiſtent. But as Things are ſometimes better diſcerned in one Point of View, than another; give me leave to illuſtrate, in a familiar Manner, what really ſeems to me to want no illuſtration at all.——— When you touch a Harpſichord, are not the tremulous Motions

* Third Reply, ſ. 12.
** Third Reply, ſ. 11.
† Second Reply, ſ. 4.

imme-

immediately communicated from one End of the Strings to the other?

*C.* They are ſo.

*P.* And yet it is only one End of them, that the Quills ſtrike.

*C.* One only.

*P.* Might not any *living* and *perceptive* Being, though at the remote End of the Strings, be full as ſenſible of their Motion, as if placed juſt where the Motion began?

*C.* Undoubtedly.

*P.* Shall we compare our Nerves to theſe Strings?

*C.* Why not?

*P.* Are not the Nerves the Inſtruments of our ſeveral Senſations? And do they not all terminate in, and communicate with, the Brain *?

*C.* I apprehend ſo.

*P.* In what Way or Manner this Communication is form'd, is not ſo eaſy to determine; † but the thing itſelf, I believe, will not be conteſted. And therefore let us now ſuppoſe, that the Brain is the proper *Senſory* ** of the Soul; and that the Soul is a *living*

* *Cheſelden's* Anatomy, p. 269—271. † Ibid.

** By *Senſory* is here only meant the Place, to which the Soul is ſuppoſed immediately preſent.

and

and *perceptive* Subſtance †.

*C.* Admitting all this, pray what follows?

*P.* It neceſſarily follows, that the Soul muſt be as ſenſible of what affects the moſt diſtant Part of the Body, as if it was *immediately preſent* to that Part itſelf. For being *preſent* to its own proper *Senſory*, which has a Communication with the whole nervous Syſtem, it muſt be *preſent* to all the Images of Things, and to all the Sounds, which are there formed; and muſt likewiſe there *perceive*, whatever can diſturb or injure the very remoteſt Parts.

So that notwithſtanding the Soul be not *every where* preſent, and cannot *immediately* act, where it is not; yet by the Aſſiſtance of the Nerves, it is capable of influencing the whole Body, and of being mutually influenced by That.

It is not hereby pretended to deſcribe, *how* the Soul *ſees* thoſe Images, or *hears* thoſe Sounds, or is *ſenſible* of thoſe Motions; ſince the whole muſt be effected in a Way altogether inexplicable by all Laws of Mechaniſm whatever.

But, I preſume, we may from hence very eaſily conceive, *that* the Soul may be *as ſen-*

† Newtoni Optice, Quæſt. 20. p. 315.

*ſible*

*ſible* of what affects or injures the moſt diſtant Part of the Body, as if it was *immediately* preſent to that affected or injured Part itſelf. For indeed, was the Soul never ſo near it, we ſhould ſtill be at the ſame loſs to underſtand, *how* any mechanical Motions of Matter, could any way affect or influence an *immaterial* Subſtance.

*C.* However, if the Soul really perceives in its own proper *Senſory*, any Hurt receiv'd in the remoteſt Parts; yet as This cannot be done, till ſome Sort of Motion (whether of the Solids or Fluids, is not material,) be continued on to the Brain: ſo one wou'd naturally think, that we ſhou'd apprehend all our Pain to be in that very Place, where the Soul is imagined to be immediately preſent; and where by means of that Preſence, the *Senſation* actually commences, rather than feel ſuch Pain in the particular Part injured.

For there the Soul is not ſuppoſed to be preſent; nor conſequently any *Senſation* form'd.

And therefore upon theſe Suppoſitions, it would ſeem to me, that all our *Senſations* muſt actually be in the very ſuppoſed Place of the Soul's Reſidence, and no where elſe.

*P.* And

*P.* And is there not much the ſame Difficulty, with Regard to *viſible* Objects? Theſe certainly do not *appear* to be in *that Place*, where the Soul is preſent, and diſcerns them; but at very different Diſtances from us, according to their ſeveral Situations *. So that as Objects, at leaſt *ſeem* to be, not *where* the Images of them are perceiv'd by the Soul; but in that *very Place*, from whence the Rays of Light were firſt reflected from ſuch Objects: in like Manner, we are not ſenſible, of the Pain of a wounded Limb, in that Part where the *Senſation* muſt begin by the immediate Preſence of the Soul; but only there, where the Nerves or animal Spirits were firſt put in Motion.

In ſhort, all Nature is full of Myſteries. And tho' one Difficulty will never ſolve another; yet no Difficulty whatever ſhou'd drive Men to frame *Hypotheſes*, which are no way reconcileable either to Reaſon or common Senſe.

* We are here only conſidering Thoſe, whoſe *viſive* Faculties have been ſettled and perfected by due Uſe and Exerciſe. For it has been obſerved, that ſuch as have juſt been brought to Sight, apprehend no Difference at all, with Reſpect to the Diſtances of Objects.—— See *Philoſoph. Tranſact. Num.* 402.

*C.* Well, *Phædo*, I plainly find, you wou'd have me a Convert to an *immaterial* Principle.

*P.* If I ſhou'd not in the leaſt doubt, my Friend, but, upon a proper Reflection, you wou'd diſcern the abſolute Neceſſity of ſuch a Principle; don't imagine that I make a bad Complement to your Underſtanding.

*C.* But what then ſhou'd induce Mr. *Hobbes* to pronounce an *immaterial* Subſtance to be a *Contradiction* * ?

*P.* Whatever might be the Reaſon, why that unhappy Philoſopher never cou'd diſtinguiſh between *Subſtance* and *Matter* †; whether thro' want of Attention, or from any other Cauſe; yet what he ventured to pronounce a *Contradiction*, has been frequently demonſtrated to be a *certain Truth*, not to be *contradicted*" ‖.

* Lev. Part. 3. c. 34. p. 214.

† P. 207. 211.

‖ See amongſt other fine Writers upon this Subject, *Locke's* Hum. Und. B. 4. c. 10. Dr. *Bentley's Boyle's* Lectures, Dr. *Clarke's* Anſwer to Mr. *Dodwell*, with the ſeveral Defenſes, and a late *Enquiry into the Nature of the Human Soul.*

SOME

# SOME ENQUIRIES, &c.

## DIALOGUE II.

### *CEBES* and *PHÆDO.*

*C.* LET us proceed now to conſider the *Divine Attributes:* for tho' I am ſometimes inclined to believe, that They may certainly be underſtood; by which I mean, that we may frame ſome reaſonable Conception of their *true Nature*; yet I muſt frankly own, I am often apt to think with Mr. *Hobbes*, that we underſtand *nothing* of what God is; and that the *Attributes*, we give the Deity, are *mere* Terms of Honour and Re-

ſpect *. And further he obſerves, in a very lively Manner, that " They who venture to " reaſon of his Nature, from theſe Attri- " butes of Honour, loſing their Underſtand- " ing in the very firſt Attempt, fall from " one Inconvenience into another, without " End, and without Number; in the ſame " Manner, as when a Man ignorant of the " Ceremonies of a Court, coming into the " Preſence of a greater Perſon, than he is " uſed to ſpeak to, and ſtumbling at his En- " trance;—— to ſave himſelf from falling, " lets ſlip his Cloak;—— to recover his " Cloak, lets fall his Hat, and with one Diſ- " order after another, diſcovers his Aſtoniſh- " ment and Ruſticity"†.

*P.* Pray, my Friend, don't let all this *Wit* and *Satyr* prevent your reconſidering the fine Reaſonings of only two Writers; tho' many others might be mentioned. I am perſuaded that upon an attentive Review, you will find in the One, a very *conciſe*, but a very *clear* and *full* Proof, that there has been from all Eternity, not only an *immaterial* Being; but an *immaterial* Being of *infinite Power* and *Wiſdom* **. And in the other, ‡ you will

* *Lev.* Part 3. c. 34. p. 208. and Part 4. c. 46. p. 371.
† Ibid. p. 374.
** *Locke's* Hum. Und. B. 4. c. 10.
‡ Dr. *Clarke.*

meet

meet with ſuch Arguments, as I durſt ſay, you will think entirely anſwer to the Title of the Book, which is, a *Demonſtration of the Being and Attributes of God.*

In ſhort, when you have once more well weigh'd the Force of their Reaſonings, I believe you will be ſo far from imagining, that *They loſt their Underſtanding in the very firſt Attempt*, that you will rather conclude, They only want to be *underſtood* themſelves, in order to improve every Man's *Underſtanding* that reads them.

Nor is it, at all, to be wonder'd at, if Gentlemen, who have had the Advantage of *divine Revelation*, ſhould be able to treat of theſe Things, with all the Force of *demonſtrative* Evidence; ſince many of the wiſer Ancients, who had nothing to guide or direct them, but the Light of their own Minds, cou'd not only diſcover the Unity * of God, but ſeveral of his *divine Attri-*

* *Xenophanes* ſeems plainly, by the firſt of the following Lines, to have believed the Unity,

Εἷς θεὸς ἔντε θεοῖσι καὶ ἀνθρώποισι μέγιστος,
Οὔτι δέμας θνητοῖσιν ὁμοίιος, οὐδὲ νόημα.

Theſe Verſes are indeed cited by the learned *Clemens Alexandrinus*, as a Proof that *Xenophanes* both held the Unity and Incorporeity of God, —— Ἓν γοῦν καὶ Ξενοφάνης ὁ Καλοφώνιος, διδάσκων ὅτι εἷς καὶ ἀσώματος ὁ θεός. Stromat. l. 5. p. 601.

*butes*

*butes*, both natural and moral *. So undoubtedly true, is what an inspired Apostle affirms,

But the last does, by no Means, appear to have been his Opinion. *Xenophanes* unum quidem Deum esse putavit, at non ἀσώματον, says the very learned Archbishop *Potter*, in his Notes on that Place.———

What we have in *Diogenes Laertius* of that Philosopher, is very little; and that which is related of his Sentiments with regard to the Deity, only comprises the Sense of the last Verse,——— οὐσίαν θεοῦ σφαιροειδῆ, μηδὲν ὅμοιον ἔχουσαν ἀνθρώπῳ. He denies the divine Substance to be in any Respect, like to Man; though he supposes it *Spherical*.

Vid. *Menagii* Observationes in *Diog. Laert.* Lib. 9. seg. 19.

* *Thales* was so far from allowing, that a wicked Man's Actions were hid from the Gods, that he denied so much as the Man's *Thoughts* to be concealed from them.——— Ἀλλ' οὐδὲ διανοούμενος λήθει θεούς. Apud *Laertium*, L. 1. seg. 36.

*Xenophon* represents *Cambyses* assuring *Cyrus*, that the Gods *are acquainted with future Events*, ἴσασι καὶ ὅ,τι —— ἀποβήσεται. De Instit. Cyr. L. 1.

And he likewise affirms, that *both* Greeks *and* Barbarians *believe the same*.—— In Convivio.

In the following Quotation, he makes *Socrates* to assert not only the *infinite Knowledge* of the Deity; but his being *every where present*, ——— Σωκράτης δὲ πάντα μὲν ἡγεῖτο θεοὺς εἰδέναι, τάτε λεγόμενα καὶ πραττόμενα, καὶ τὰ σιγῇ βουλευόμενα, πανταχοῦ δὲ παρεῖναι. *Xenoph. Memoral.* L. I. This Philosopher, just before his Death, is represented by *Plato*, as declaring, that God *only knew*, whether he or his surviving Friends were like to be happiest, —— Ἄδηλον παντὶ πλὴν ἢ τῷ θεῷ. *Plat. Apol Soc. in fine.* And moreover *Plato* frequently introduces him as a most strenuous asserter of the *great Gooodness* of the Deity, of his *Justice*, *Power*, *Knowledge*, and *universal Care* of his Creatures.———

Θεοί τ' εἰσι καὶ ἀγαθοὶ, δίκην τιμῶντες διαφερόντως ἀνθρώπων. —— ἐπιμελεῖς σμικρῶν — οὐχ ἧττον ἢ τῷ μεγέθει διαφερόντων. —— Τὴν τῶν πάντων ἐπιμέλειαν οἰκειοτάτην αὐτῶν οὖσαν κέκτηνται.——Θεοὺς—— καὶ ὁρᾶν, καὶ ἀκούειν πάντα, λάθειν δὲ αὐτοὺς οὐδὲν δυνατὸν εἶναι.——— Δύνασθαι πάντα —— καὶ μὴν ἀγαθούς τε καὶ ἀρέστους ὡμολογήκαμεν αὐτοὺς εἶναι. —— Μὴ τοίνυν τόνγε θεὸν ἀξιώσαμεν ποτὲ θνητῶν δημιουργῶν φαυλότερον. —— Τὸν δὲ θεὸν ὄντα τε σοφώτατον, βουλόμενόν τ' ἐπιμελεῖσθαι καὶ δυνάμενον——σμικρῶν μηδαμῇ ἐπιμελεῖσθαι, τῶν δὲ μεγάλων. *Plato* de Legibus, L. 10.

Nor is there any Thing in this whole Dialogue, which *Socrates* that

that God *left not himself without Witness* *. And moreover, that *That which may be known of God, is manifest in* [or *to*] *Them; for God hath shewed it unto Them* †. *For the invisible Things of Him, from the Creation of the World are clearly seen, being understood by the Things that are made, even his eternal Power and Godhead* ‖.

guards more against, than the supposing, that either Human Affairs, in general, are neglected by Providence; or that, at most, none but the greatest are regarded.

*Zaleucus* wou'd have us to honour the Gods, *as the Authors of all the Happiness that befalls us:* ὡς αἰτίους ὄντας ἁπάντων ἡμῖν ἀγαθῶν τῶν κατὰ λόγον γιγνομένων. Apud. Diod. Sic. L. 12. As to the eternal Nature of the Deity, *Thales* defined God to be That, *which had neither Beginning nor End* [*to his Existence*] τὸ θεῖον τὸ μήτε ἀρχὴν ἔχον μήτε τελευτήν. Apud. Laert. L. 1. Seg. 36. He had just before affirm'd the Deity to be *unoriginated* ἀγέννητον. And *Aristotle* maintains that God is an *Eternal, Living Being*; and concludes that *Life and Eternity are essential to Him.* —— Φαμὲν δὲ τὸν θεὸν εἶναι ζῶον ἀΐδιον ὥστε ζωὴ καὶ αἰὼν συνεχὴς καὶ ἀΐδιος ὑπάρχει τῷ θεῷ. Metaph. L. 14. C. 7

*Clemens Alexandrinus* is of Opinion, that the Discovery made of one All-mighty God, by every truly wise Man, was altogether Natural: and that the generality of those, who had not impudently set themselves against the Truth, had, from [contemplating] the Divine Providence, discern'd the eternal Goodness or Beneficence [of the Deity.]

Θεοῦ μὲν γὰρ ἔμφασις, ἑνὸς ἦν τοῦ παντοκράτορος, παρὰ πᾶσι τοῖς εὖ φρονοῦσι πάντοτε φυσική· καὶ τὸν ἀΐδιον κατὰ τὴν θείαν πρόνοιαν ἐνεργεσίας ἀντιλαμβάνοντο οἱ πλεῖστοι, οἱ καὶ μὴ τέλειον ἀπηρυθριακότες πρὸς τὴν ἀλήθειαν. Stromat. L. 5. P. 590.

* Acts xiv. 17. vid. *Grot.* in *Loc.*

† Rom. i. 19. Upon this Verse *Theophylact* observes, that tho' the Divine *Essence* is not to be known; yet the Divine *Goodness, Wisdom* and *Power* are. Τοῦ θεοῦ γὰρ, τὸ μέν ἐστι, ἄγνωστον, οἷον ἡ οὐσία αὐτοῦ· τὸ δὲ γνωστὸν, οἷον ἡ ἀγαθότης, ἡ σοφία, ἡ δύναμις.

‖ Rom. i. 20. They that wou'd see the absurd Commen-

C.

*C.* But what if we ſuppoſe, that theſe imaginary Diſcoveries of Reaſon, were merely *traditionary* Accounts, handed down from one Age and Race of Men to another; and that they owed their Original entirely to *Revelation?*

*P.* Whoever proceeds upon this *Hypotheſis*, muſt either admit that Human Reaſon *cou'd* have made theſe Diſcoveries, or that it cou'd *not*. If he maintains the former; his *Hypotheſis* is quite needleſs.

If the latter; there ought a ſufficient Reaſon to be aſſign'd, why, for Inſtance, the *Wiſdom* and *Goodneſs* of God were not as *clearly* to be *ſeen* and *underſtood* by the Works of Creation and Providence, as his *Eternal Power* and *Godhead*. But if it be ſuppoſed, that *none* of Theſe were thus diſcoverable; it is then incumbent on us, fairly to reconcile This with the expreſs Aſſertions of *Revelation* to the contrary.

*C.* Tho' one of the Fathers, who was thoroughly verſed in the ancient Philoſophers, aſſigns a natural Cauſe for theſe Diſcoveries, in one Part of his Works *; yet in another

tary of *Socinus* upon this Verſe, entirely refuted, may conſult the learned Biſhop *Pearſon*, on the Creed; as well as the *Obſervationes Sacræ Jacobi Elſner* in Loc.

* See before in the Notes, the laſt Quotation from *Clemens Alexandrinus*.

Place,

Place, he tells us, " that there is a certain " Divine *Efflux* or *Emanation* enjoy'd uni- " versally by all Mankind, especially the " learn'd; which even forces 'em to confess, " whether they will or not, that God is *One*, " and that he neither *began*, nor can *cease*, " to be" *.

*P.* It is true, that incomparably learn'd Father does, at one Time, *seem* to ascribe these Things to a *natural* Cause, and at another, to a *supernatural* one; but yet I think there is no inconsistency at all in this whole Account. And if the following Paraphrase will take in the Sense of both Passages, I believe you will be of the same Opinion.

" Those Discoveries concerning God, made " by wise and modest Enquiries after Truth, " proceeded altogether from rightly using their " *natural* Faculties. For as God Almighty has " implanted in all Mankind, the Seeds or Prin- " ciples of Knowledge; so, if duly cultivated, " they will, in a Manner, even force Men to " confess, that the Deity is *One*, *Immortal*, " and *Unoriginate*."

* Πᾶσιν γὰρ ἀπαξαπλῶς ἀνθρώποις, μάλιστα δὲ τοῖς περὶ λόγους ἐνδιατρίβουσιν, ἐνέστακταί τις ἀπόῤῥοια θεϊκή. οὗ δὴ χάριν καὶ ἄκοντες μὲν ὁμολογοῦσιν ἕνα τε εἶναι θεὸν, ἀνώλεθρον καὶ ἀγέννητον. Cohort. ad Gentes. p. 45.

*C.* However, I hope you will allow, that one of the greateſt Philoſophers of the Heathen World, does very genteely railly thoſe Men, who aſcribe *moral Attributes*, or a *moral Character* to the Deity.

" Whether, ſays he, we maintain the *Acti-*
" *ons* of the Gods, to be *juſt* or *valiant*, *li-*
" *beral* or *temperate*, or of any other Deno-
" mination whatever, the whole will be found
" altogether unworthy of 'em: For what a
" Sight wou'd it be, ſhou'd the Gods be
" found trafficking, and reſtoring of Pledges?
" How greatly muſt it redound to their Hon-
" our, to engage in perilous Adventures?
" How abſurd is it to ſuppoſe, they have
" Money to beſtow? Or what a fine Com-
" mendation ſhou'd we give 'em, by offering
" to maintain that *the Gods were Strangers*
" *to vicious Inclinations* *?"

*P.* Truly, my Friend, with regard to the laſt Part of your Quotation, (tho' I ſpeak it with all due Deference to that Philoſopher's Judgment) if the ancient *Deities* had never had a *worſe* Character †, it wou'd have redounded more to their own Honour, as well as the Advantage of their Worſhipers. But

* *Ariſtot.* Ethic. Nicomach. L. 10. c. 8.

† See the Cohortatio ad Gentes of *Clemens Alexandrinus*, p. 20.

ſtill,

ſtill, I wou'd further obſerve, that whenever you meet with any Writer upon the *Divine Attributes*, who acquaints us that the Actions of the Deity, are either *temperate* or *valiant*; or that his *Liberality* conſiſts in beſtowing *Money*; or his *Juſtice*, in performing the Office of a Merchant or Broker: — I ſay, when you meet with ſuch a Writer on the *Divine Attributes*, you may reaſonably ſend him to *Ariſtotle* for Correction.

*C.* I very much miſtake that Philoſopher, if he does not deſign to condemn every Perſon whatever, who pretends to diſcourſe on the *moral Character* of the Deity.

*P.* Let us then thoroughly examine what leads to that Paſſage; that ſo we may come, if poſſible, at the true Meaning of the Author.

In that Chapter, and the two preceding ones, he treats of Happineſs; the different Degrees of it; and whence it ariſes. In the firſt Place, he maintains that * "Happineſs

* — Εἰπομεν δ', ὅτι οὐκ ἔστιν ἕξις. [εὐδαιμονία] — ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον εἰς ἐνέργειάν τινα θετέον. — τῶν δ' ἐνεργειῶν, αἱ μὲν ἐισὶν ἀναγκαῖαι καὶ δι' ἕτερα αἱρεταὶ, αἱ δὲ καθ' αὑτάς· δῆλον ὅτι τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν τῶν καθ' αὑτὰς αἱρετῶν τινὰ θετέον, καὶ οὐ τῶν δ' ἄλλο. — τοιαῦται [καθ' αὑτὰς αἱρεταὶ] δ' εἶναι δοκοῦσιν αἱ κατ' ἀρετὴν πρᾶξεις· — καὶ τῶν παιδιῶν δὴ, αἱ ἡδεῖαι. — φαίνεται δ' ὅπως σπουδάζῃ, — ἐρθῶς ἔχειν δοκεῖ. — δοκεῖ δ' ὁ εὐδαίμων βίος κατ' ἀρετὴν εἶναι. — ἡ εὐδαιμονία — ἐν ταῖς κατ' ἀρετὴν ἐνεργείαις. L. 10. c. 6.

" is not a *Habit*, but that it rather consists " in the Discharge of some Duty or Functi- " on. And as these are of two Kinds, *viz.* " either such as are necessary in order to " some other End; or such as are desira- " ble for their own Sakes; he infers that " Happiness must consist in the latter. Of " this Sort, he rekons *virtuous Actions*, and " *agreeable Recreations*. But strictly guards " against the Excess and Abuse of the last; " and concludes that a *happy* Life, must be a " Life of *Virtue*." He then goes on to observe, that * " if Happiness consists in the

* Εἰ δ' ἐστὶν εὐδαιμονία, κατ' ἀρετὴν ἐνέργεια, εὔλογον κατὰ τὴν κρατίστην. αὕτη δ' ἔτη τοῦ ἀρίστου. εἴτε δὴ νοῦς τοῦτο, εἴτε ἄλλό τι, ὃ δὴ κατὰ φύσιν δοκεῖ ἄρχειν καὶ ἡγεῖσθαι. — ἡ τούτου ἐνέργεια κατὰ τὴν οἰκείαν ἀρετὴν εἴη ἂν ἡ τελεία εὐδαιμονία. ὅτι δ' ἐστὶ θεωρητικὴ, εἴρηται. [L. 1. C. 13.] κρατίστη τε γὰρ αὐτὴ ἐστὶν ἡ ἐνέργεια. καὶ γὰρ ὁ νοῦς τῶν ἐν ἡμῖν, καὶ τῶν γνωστῶν, περὶ ἃ ὁ νοῦς. — οἰόμεθά τε δεῖν ἡδονὴν παραμεμίχθαι τῇ εὐδαιμονίᾳ, ἡδίστη δὲ τῶν κατ' ἀρετὴν ἐνεργειῶν, ἡ κατὰ τὴν σοφίαν ὁμολογουμένως ἐστί. δοκεῖ γοῦν ἡ σοφία θαυμαστὰς ἡδονὰς ἔχειν καθαριότητι καὶ τῷ βεβαίῳ. — ὅτι [ἀγωγὴ] λεγομένη αὐτάρκεια, περὶ τὴν θεωρητικὴν μάλιστ' ἂν εἴη. τῶν μὲν γὰρ πρὸς τὸ ζῆν ἀναγκαίων, καὶ σοφὸς, καὶ δίκαιος, καὶ οἱ λοιποὶ δέονται· τοῖς δὲ τοιούτοις ἱκανῶς κεχορηγημένων, ὁ μὲν δίκαιος δεῖται, πρὸς οὓς δικαιοπραγήσει, καὶ μεθ' ὧν. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ὁ σώφρων, καὶ ὁ ἀνδρεῖος, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἕκαστος. ὁ δὲ σοφὸς, καὶ καθ' αὐτὸν ὤν, δύναται θεωρεῖν· — αὐταρκέστατος. δόξειε δ' ἂν αὐτὴ μόνη δι' αὐτὴν ἀγαπᾶσθαι· οὐδὲν γὰρ ἀπ' αὐτῆς γίνεται παρὰ τὸ θεωρῆσαι. Ἀπὸ δὲ τῶν πρακτῶν, ἢ πλεῖον ἢ ἔλαττον περιποιώμεθα παρὰ τὸ πρᾶξιν. — ὅσα — τῷ μακαρίῳ ἀπονέμεται, κατὰ ταύτην τὴν ἐνέργειαν φαίνεται ὄντα. ἡ τελεία δὴ εὐδαιμονία αὕτη ἂν εἴη ἀνθρώπου, λαβοῦσα μῆκος βίου τέλειον. — ὁ δὲ τοιοῦτος ἂν εἴη κρείττων βίος, ἢ κατὰ ἄνθρωπον. οὐ γὰρ ᾗ ἄνθρωπός ἐστιν, οὕτω βιώσεται, ἀλλ' ᾗ θεῖόν τι ἐν αὐτῷ ὑπάρχει. ὅσῳ δὲ διαφέρει τοῦτο τοῦ συνθέτου, τοσούτῳ καὶ ἡ ἐνέργεια τῆς κατὰ τὴν ἄλλην ἀρετήν. Χρὴ δὲ οὐ κατὰ τοὺς παραινοῦντας, ἀνθρώπινα φρονεῖν

" Exercise

" Exercise of Virtue, it is reasonable to sup-
" pose, that it consists in the Exercise of the
" *highest* Virtue. This he affirms to be the
" proper Province of the chief and govern-
" ing Principle in a Man; whether this be
" the Mind, or whatsoever else it is: And
" that from hence arises a *perfect Happi-*
" *ness*. That this Happiness is of a *contem-*
" *plative* Nature; and that Contemplation is
" the noblest Exercise. For as the Mind ex-
" cells every Thing else belonging to us; so
" of all Things, which can be known, *They*
" are the Principal, which are the proper
" Subjects of Contemplation. —— Moreover,
" as Pleasure ought to be closely connected
" with Happiness; so amongst all the virtu-
" ous Exercises of the Mind, *That* is the
" pleasantest, which proceeds from Wisdom.
" And Wisdom, he observes, seems to con-
" tain Pleasures, which may excite our Ad-
" miration, both on account of their being
" pure and lasting: and withal, that That
" kind of Life, which is said to be *Self-suf-*
" *ficient*, or to want nothing, must be chiefly
" *contemplative*. For as to those Things,

ἄνθρωπον ὄντα, οὐδὲ θνητὰ τὴν θνητὸν· ἀλλ' ἐφ' ὅσον ἐνδέχεται, ἀπαθανατίζειν, καὶ ἅπαντα ποιεῖν πρὸς τὸ ζῆν κατὰ τὸ κρατιστον τῶν ἐν αὐτῷ. —— Τὸ γὰρ οἰκεῖον ἑκάστῳ τῇ φύσει, κρατιστον καὶ ἥδιστον ἐστ' ἑκάστῳ· καὶ τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ δὴ ὁ κατὰ τὸν νοῦν βίος, εἴπερ μάλιστα τοῦτο ἄνθρωπος. Οὗτος ἄρα καὶ εὐδαιμονέστατος. C. 7.

" which

" which are neceſſary to Life, they are want-
" ed by the Wiſe and Juſt, as well as by
" Others. Nay, even when Men abound
" with Things of this Sort, the juſt Man
" [for Inſtance] may want ſome proper Ob-
" ject, to exerciſe his Juſtice towards. Nor
" will the temperate Man, the Valiant, or
" any of the reſt, be without their reſpective
" Wants. Whereas the wiſe Man can con-
" template, by himſelf; and from himſelf
" can be abundantly ſupply'd. This Happi-
" neſs alone, ſays the Philoſopher, appears
" deſirable for its own Sake: Since nothing
" ariſes from it, beſides Contemplation.
" Whereas from what we do, ſomething
" more or leſs reſults to us, beſides the mere
" Action itſelf. —— After this, he urges the
" Preference of *Contemplation*, as containing
" all Things, which a happy Man is ſup-
" poſed to poſſeſs. And maintains, that the
" Happineſs of ſuch a Man won'd be perfect,
" were his Life but perfectly lengthened out.
" Inaſmuch as ſuch a Life would be above
" the Rate of what is barely *human:* And
" the Man would live not merely *as* a *Man*,
" but as having *ſomething divine* within him-
" ſelf. The Exerciſe of which divine Prin-
" ciple, the Philoſopher as far prefers to the
" Exerciſe of *moral Virtue*, as the Principle

" itſelf is preferable to the whole Compound " of Soul and Body. He afterwards rejects " the Advice of thoſe, who would perſuade " Mankind to reliſh only Things of a *mor-* " *ral* Nature; and contends that Men ought, " as far as poſſible, even to render them- " ſelves *immortal*; and to make every thing " ſubſervient to a Life of Contemplation. " This is call'd *living according to the beſt* " *and higheſt Principle within 'em*; which " is here ſuppoſed to be the *Mind*. And " moreover, ſince whatever is perfectly a- " greeable to Nature, is beſt and pleaſanteſt " to every One, he reaſons, that a Life thus " led, muſt be the moſt pleaſant and happy " Life for a Man; becauſe he is chiefly de- " nominated a *Man*, from this very Principle."

* The Philoſopher next proceeds to con- ſider *moral* Virtues. " The ſeveral Acts or

* Δευτέρως δ', ὁ κατὰ τὴν ἄλλην ἀρετήν. αἱ γὰρ κατ' αὐτὴν ἐνέργειαι, ἀνθρωπικαί. δίκαια γὰρ, καὶ ἀνδρεῖα, καὶ τὰ ἄλλα, τὰ κατὰ τὰς ἀρετὰς, πρὸς ἀλλήλους πράττομεν ἐν συναλλάγμασι καὶ χρείαις καὶ πράξεσι παντοίαις. —— συνηρτημέναι δ' αὗται [ἀρεταὶ] καὶ τοῖς πάθεσι, καὶ περὶ τὸ σύνθετον ἂν εἶεν· αἱ δὲ τοῦ συνθέτου ἀρεταὶ, ἀνθρωπικαί. καὶ ὁ βίος δὴ ὁ κατ' αὐτὰς καὶ ἡ εὐδαιμονία. ἡ δὲ τοῦ νοῦ κεχωρισμένη. δόξειε δ' ἂν καὶ τῆς ἐκτὸς χορηγίας ἐπὶ μικρὸν, ἢ ἐπ' ἔλαττον δεῖσθαι τῆς ἠθικῆς. —— τῷ μὲν γὰρ ἐλευθερίῳ δεήσει χρημάτων, πρὸς τὸ πράττειν τὰ ἐλευθέρια, καὶ τῷ δικαίῳ δὲ, εἰς τὰς ἀνταποδόσεις· αἱ γὰρ βουλήσεις, ἄδηλοι, προσποιοῦνται δὲ καὶ οἱ μὴ δίκαιοι βούλεσθαι δικαιοπραγεῖν· τῷ ἀνδρείῳ δὲ, δυνάμεως, εἴπερ ἐπιτελεῖ τι τῶν κατ' ἀρετὴν, καὶ τῷ σώφρονι, ἐξουσίας. πῶς γὰρ δῆλος ἔσται ἢ οὗτος, ἢ τῶν ἄλλων τις; πρὸς δὲ τὰς πράξεις, πολλῶν δεῖται, ——

" Branches

" Branches of which, ſuch as *Juſtice*, *Val-*
" *our*, and the like, he calls *Human*; as re-
" lating to the Dealings and Tranſactions of
" Mankind with one another. — And ſoon af-
" ter he gives theſe Virtues again the ſame
" Denomination, as being connected with
" the Paſſions, and belonging to That, which
" is compounded of Soul and Body. From
" hence he infers, that *ſuch* as theſe Virtues
" are, *ſuch* muſt be the Life, and *ſuch* the
" Happineſs of Thoſe that are employ'd in
" 'em. [That is, not *divine*, like a Life of
" Contemplation; but merely *Human*] where-
" as the Happineſs of the Mind is ſeparated
" [from all *human* Mixture] and ſeems to
" want very little of any outward Sup-
" ply: or however, leſs than the Hap-
" pineſs, which ariſes from thoſe *moral*
" Virtues. —— Money, for inſtance, will be
" wanting both to the *liberal* and the *juſt*
" Man; that ſo the one may have it in his

Ἀλλ' ὡς εἰπεῖν, καὶ ἐμπόδιά ἐστι, πρός γε τὴν θεωρίαν. —— ἡ δὲ τελεία εὐδαιμονία, ὅτι θεωρητική τις ἐστιν ἐνέργεια, καὶ ἐντεῦθεν ἂν φανείη. τοὺς θεοὺς γὰρ μάλιστα ὑπειλήφαμεν μακαρίους, καὶ εὐδαίμονας εἶναι, πράξεις δὲ ποίας ἀπονεῖμαι χρεὼν αὐτοῖς; πότερα τὰς δικαίας; ἢ γελοῖοι φανοῦνται συναλλάττοντες, καὶ παρακαταθήκας ἀποδιδόντες, καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα τοιαῦτα; ἀλλὰ τὰς ἀνδρείους, ὑπομένοντας τὰ φοβερὰ καὶ κινδυνεύοντας, ὅτι καλόν. ἢ τὰς ἐλευθερίους; τίνι δὲ δώσουσιν; ἄτοπον δ', εἰ καὶ ἔσται αὐτοῖς νόμισμα, ἢ τι τοιοῦτον. εἰ δὲ σώφρονες, τί ἂν εἶεν; ἢ φορτικὸς ὁ ἔπαινος, ὅτι οὐκ ἔχουσι φαύλας ἐπιθυμίας;

" Power

" Power to ſhew his Generoſity; and the o-
" ther be enabled to give every one his due.
" For, there is no knowing what the Deſign
" or Intention of a Man is, ſince they often
" put on the Appearance of Juſtice, when
" they are altogether Strangers to the Virtue
" itſelf. And thus, in like Manner, it is im-
" poſſible for the *Valiant* or the *Temperate*,
" to diſcover either their Valour or their
" Temperance, without the Means requiſite
" to this Purpoſe. —— He afterwards takes
" notice, that many Things are wanted with
" reſpect to *Actions*; which are rather an Im-
" pediment, than Help, to *Contemplation*.—
" But now, ſays the Philoſopher, that *per-*
" *fect Happineſs* is of a *contemplative* Nature,
" may appear even from hence, that tho'
" we ſuppoſe the Gods to enjoy the moſt
" conſummate Happineſs; yet what Sort of
" *Actions* ought we to aſcribe to them?
" Shall we attribute thoſe *Actions* to them,
" which are *juſt?* What a pretty Figure
" would the Gods make, were we to repre-
" ſent them, *bargaining* or *contracting* with
" one another; and reſtoring of Pledges, and
" the like? Shall we ſay that their *Actions*
" are *valiant* * ? Inaſmuch as it is *honourable*

* The learned *Sylburgius* prefers this reading, which relates to

" to undertake *dangerous Exploits.* Or ſhall
" we aſcribe to them, *ſuch* as are *liberal* or
" *generous?* But to whom ſhall they give?
" It would be plainly abſurd, to ſuppoſe they
" had *Money*, or any Thing of the like Na-
" ture. However, ſhall we maintain, that
" their [*Actions*] are agreeable to the Laws
" of *Temperance* *? But what a coarſe Com-
" plement would it be, to ſay that the Gods
" have no *vicious Deſires?* In ſhort, if we
" run over every *Action* whatever, we ſhall
" find each but trivial, and unworthy of the
" Gods. However, as it is agreed on all

the *Actions* of the Gods; before that, which refers *valiant* and *liberal* to the Gods themſelves.

* As ſome Copies have *αἱ σώφρονες* inſtead of *οἱ δὲ*, &c. and as *Ariſtotle* begins and ends this whole Paragraph with the *Actions* of the Deity; I have here added the Word [*Actions*] as moſt ſuitable to the Deſign of that Philoſopher; tho' my Edition gives no expreſs Warrant for it. *Διεξιῶσι δὲ πάντα φαίνοιτ' ἂν τὰ περὶ τὰς πράξεις, μικρὰ καὶ ἀνάξια θεῶν. ἀλλὰ μὴν ζῆν τε πάντες ὑπολήφασιν αὐτὸς, καὶ ἐνεργεῖν ἄρα. οὐ γὰρ δὴ καθεύδειν, ὥσπερ τὸν Ἐνδυμίωνα. τῷ δὴ ζῶντι ἢ πράττειν ἀφῃρημένῳ, ἔτι δὲ μᾶλλον τὸ ποιεῖν, τί λείπεται πλὴν θεωρίας; ὥστε ἡ τοῦ θεοῦ ἐνέργεια, μακαριότητι διαφέρουσα, θεωρητικὴ ἂν εἴη. καὶ τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων δὴ ἡ τοιαύτη συγγενεστάτη, εὐδαιμονιστάτη. σημεῖον δὲ, καὶ τὸ μὴ μεῖζον τὰ λοιπὰ ζῶα εὐδαιμονίας, ἢ τοιαύτης ἐνεργείας ἐστερῆσθαι τελείως. ὁ δὲ καὶὰ νοῦν ἐνεργῶν, καὶ τοῦτον θεοφιλέστατον, καὶ διακείμενον ἄριστα, καὶ θεοφιλέστατος ἔοικεν εἶναι. εἰ γὰρ τὶς ἐπιμέλεια τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων ὑπὸ θεῶν γίνεται, ὥσπερ δοκεῖ, καὶ εἴη ἂν εὔλογον χαίρειν τε αὐτοὺς τῷ ἀρίστῳ καὶ τῷ συγγενεστάτῳ· τοῦτο δ' ἂν εἴη ὁ νοῦς· καὶ τοὺς ἀγαπῶντας μάλιστα τοῦτο καὶ τιμῶντας, ἀνθρωπείων, ὡς τῶν φίλων αὐτοῖς ἐπιμελουμένους, καὶ ὀρθῶς τε καὶ καλῶς πραττοντας. ὅτι δὲ ταῦτα πάντα τῷ σοφῷ μάλιστα ὑπάρχει, δῆλον. θεοφιλέστατον ἄρα. τὸν αὐτὸν δ' εἰκὸς καὶ εὐδαιμονέστατον. ὥστε καὶ οὕτως εἴη ὁ σοφὸς μάλιστ' εὐδαίμων.* C. 8.

" Hands

" Hands, that they *live*; ſo they muſt exer-
" ciſe or employ themſelves in ſome Func-
" tion, or other: ſince we cannot ſuppoſe,
" that they ſleep away their Time, like *En-*
" *dymion*. But now, if a living Being is
" both deprived of *moral* and *mechanical*
" Actions; what can remain for him, but
" *Contemplation* only? Wherefore that, which
" the Deity employs himſelf in; and which
" excells every Thing, in point of Happi-
" neſs, muſt conſiſt in *Contemplation*. And
" the nearer Mens Employments approach
" to this, the nearer Men approach to the
" greateſt Happineſs. And a further Argu-
" ment of this, is, that other Animals being
" altogether deprived of *Contemplation*, are de-
" prived of Happineſs. Towards the End of this
" Chapter, he thinks it probable, that a con-
" templative Man, who cultivates his Mind,
" and is thoroughly well diſpos'd, muſt be very
" dear to the Deity. *For if the Gods*, ſays he,
" *have any Care of human Affairs, as it is likely*
" *they have* *, it muſt be agreeable to Reaſon,

* It muſt appear evident from hence, that *Ariſtotle* held a Providence, ſuperintending the Affairs of Mankind: And conſequently what is infer'd from other Parts of his Works, that *he maintained Providence to deſcend no lower than the Moon*, μέχρι σελήνης ἐπῆλθε καθάπερ ἡ προνοια, *Clem. Alex. Stromat.* l. v. p. 591. muſt relate only to a *particular* Providence over *Individuals*. See Mr. *Warburton's Divine Legation of Moſes*, p. 399. 2d Edit.

" that they ſhould take Pleaſure in the [hu-
" man] Mind, as being both the beſt Thing,
" and neareſt related to themſelves; and like-
" wiſe that they ſhould reward thoſe, who
" thus highly eſteem and value it. Since ſuch
" Men take care of what the Gods delight
" in; and alſo do thoſe Things, which are
" right and honourable. Now as it is plain,
" that all this chiefly makes up the Character
" of a wiſe Man; he muſt certainly be great-
" ly favour'd and loved by the Deity; and
" perhaps enjoy a very large Share of Feli-
" city. Wherefore we may conclude, that
" a wiſe Man, by this very means, may be-
" come exceeding happy."

From this long Quotation, it evidently appears, in the firſt Place, that the Philoſopher eſteem'd *Contemplation* to be of far greater Value, than the Exerciſe of every *moral* Virtue *: As ariſing from a Diviner Principle, and as being productive of the greateſt Happineſs.

*Secondly*, As Contemplation is the Source of this Happineſs; therefore the Gods are ſuppoſed to do nothing but contemplate. Whereas the *moral* Virtues being founded in a lower

* *Laertius* might well obſerve, that he preferred the contemplative Life to all others. Τὸν θεωρητικὸν [βίον] προτίθησιν. L. 5. ſeg. 31.

Principle;

Principle; attended with various Wants and Deficiences; and producing but a lower Degree of Happineſs, he confines the Exerciſe of Theſe to Mankind only. Tho', as Men are likewiſe capable of Contemplation; ſo the more of their Time is ſpent in it, the nearer they approach to perfect Happineſs. But Brute Animals not contemplating at all, are therefore excluded from every Degree of it.

And, *laſtly*, According as Men are careful to cultivate both the *contemplative* and *moral* Virtues, They will render themſelves highly acceptable to the Deity; and will meet with a ſuitable recompence from him: ſince it ſeems likely, that he takes Care and Notice of human Affairs. This appears to be the Sum and Subſtance of what has been taken from this Philoſopher's *Ethics*. And tho' ſome of his Expreſſions look a little *Suſpicious*, might he not however deſign to guard his Son *Nicomachus* againſt entertaining mean Thoughts of the Gods; as if They employ'd themſelves in the ſame *low Way* and *Manner* with Mankind; rather than intend to ridicule the *moral Attributes* of the Deity? The Reaſon I would offer for this Conjecture, is, that the Gods, in the Opinion of that Philoſopher, *take Care of Human Affairs*,

*ſairs*, and *will reward ſuch a Behaviour as is right and honourable and pleaſing to Themſelves:* And if the very Eſſence of two of thoſe *moral Attributes*, to wit, *Goodneſs* and *Juſtice*, be not comprehended in all This, I ſhould be glad to be inform'd, what *Goodneſs* or *Juſtice* is. However, my Friend, if it ſhould appear to be fact, that *Ariſtotle* really maintain'd, that the Deity was neither *Juſt*, *Beneficent*, or *Holy*, I would propoſe it to be conſider'd, *how far* that Great Philoſopher *has conſulted for the Reputation of his Gods?* And withal, Whether there muſt not appear ſome Foundation for the Charge of a very pious and eloquent Father, — that "He taught Things of the Deity, which "were not *very conſiſtent.*" *

*C.* But does not *Cicero* himſelf introduce this very Paſſage into one of his Dialogues, as containing an Argument of ſome Weight and Authority †?

*P.* Whether that Part of *Cicero*, which you have your Eye upon, be taken out of *Ariſtotle*, or not; as the Learned differ about it ‖, ſo it is of no Moment, with regard to

* *Ariſtoteles* de *Deo* ipſe ſecum diſſidet, & repugnantia dicit & ſentit. —— *Lactant.* L. 1 c. 5.

† De Natur. Deor. L. 3. c. 15.

‖ *Muretus* and *Urſinus* ſuppoſe it borrow'd from *Ariſtotle:* but the late learn'd Maſter of *Queen's College, Cambridge*, in his

our

our principal Enquiry. For if that Paſſage has no Support from *Reaſon*, the mere *Authority* of Philoſophers will not ſupport it. Beſides, you dont ſurely apprehend, that *Cicero* is anſwerable for all the Arguments, which are found in his Dialogues. You know his Buſineſs was only to give a fair Repreſentation of the Reaſonings of Thoſe who are there diſputing. And thus, juſt before he deſcribes this Controverſy, he tells us, that he *will produce the Opinions of the Philoſophers, concerning the Nature of the Gods* *.

The Philoſophers, who manage this Diſpute, are *Cotta* an *Academic*, *Balbus* a *Stoic*, and *Velleius* an *Epicurean*. This laſt opens the Debate, and gives ſuch an Account of the Deity, as was agreeable to the Principles of his own *Sect* †. *Cotta*, thro' the Remainder of that Book, replies to his Arguments; and routs the Gods of *Epicurus*.

In the next Book, *Balbus* ſtrenuouſly maintains, as any other learn'd *Stoic* would have done, the Exiſtence of the Gods, as well as

Notes on that Place of *Cicero*, affirms that *Cotta*, who is there ſpeaking, had in view the Reaſonings of *Carneades*, the Founder of the *new Academy*; and which had been preſerv'd by *Sextus Empir.* Adver. Mathem. p. 336. And indeed there is this difference, that *Cotta* goes ſo far as to deprive the Deity of *Prudence*, *Reaſon*, and *Underſtanding*.

* Ponam in medio Sententias Philoſophorum de Naturâ Deorum. L. 1. c. 6. † C. 8. — 20.

a Divine Providence. In the Book following, where your Paſſage is to be met with, *Cotta*, like a true *Academic*, not only quarrels with the Gods of the *Stoic*, and his Arguments for them; but labours hard to prove, that *no Notice is taken of human Affairs.*

He that had juſt renounced the *Epicurean* Deities, *for having no regard to Mankind* *; ſtrongly aſſerts in his Diſpute with the *Stoic*, that *there was no ſuch thing as Providence at all.*

But ſtill notwithſtanding, he did nothing but what was perfectly agreeable with the Character of an *Academic*, whoſe *Cuſtom it was, always to contradict every Diſputant* †: *Not to interpoſe their own Authority or Judgment; but to offer what might be ſaid on either Side of the Queſtion* ‖.

In ſhort, their Rule was, *in order to find out the Truth*, to ſpeak *For* and *Againſt* every Philoſopher and Opinion whatever ‡.

* Si maxime talis eſt Deus; ut nullâ Gratiâ, nullâ hominum Caritate teneatur; VALERAT. L. 1. fine.

† Hic enim mos patrius Academiæ, adverſari ſemper Omnibus in diſputando. *De Oratore*, L. 1. c. 18.

‖ Quum autem proprium ſit Academiæ judicium ſuum nullum interponere — quid in quamque ſententiam dici poſſit, expromere, nullâ adhibitâ ſuâ Authoritate, Judicium Audientium relinquere integrum & liberum. — *De Divinat.* L. 2. ſub finem.

‡ Veri reperiendi causâ, & contra omnes Philoſophos, & pro omnibus dicere. —— *De Nat. Deor.* L. 1. c. 5. Veri inveniendi causâ, contra omnia dici oportere, & pro omnibus. —— *Acad. Quæſt.* L. 4. c. 18.

And thus conformably to theſe Rules and Cuſtoms, *Cotta*, before he begins the Diſputation with *Balbus*, declares *he does it not, ſo much in order to refute him, as for his own Information* *.

And at the Concluſion of his elaborate Harangue, he aſſures him, that what he *had offer'd, was rather for the Sake of diſcuſſing the Points in Controverſy, than to give his own Judgment* †. And not only *deſires to be confuted*; but affirms *it might eaſily be done* ‖.

Beſides it is to be obſerv'd, that *Cicero* himſelf, who was preſent during the whole Debate, tells his Friend *Brutus*, that though *Velleius* rather approved of *Cotta*'s Reaſoning; "yet that of *Balbus* appear'd to him "nearer the *Truth* ‡."

When you lay, my Friend, theſe Things together, you will hardly think that every Argument, which is to be met with in *Cicero*, can either have much Weight in itſelf; or was ſo much as eſteem'd by that Phi-

* Neque tam refellendi tui Causâ, quàm ea, quæ minus intelligebam, requirendi. L. 3. c. 1.

† Ea, quæ diſputavi, diſſerere malui, quàm judicare. L. 3. fine.

‖ Ego verò & opto redargui me, Balbe, —— & facilè me à te vinci poſſe, certo ſcio. Ibid.

‡ Ita diſceſſimus, ut Velleio Cottæ diſputatio verior, mihi Balbi ad Veritatis ſimilitudinem videtur eſſe propenſior. *Ibid.* See alſo *de Divinat.* L. 1. c. 5.

loſopher, of any conſiderable Force or Authority.

*C.* Well, let the Opinions of theſe Philoſophers be what they will, it is not however to be queſtioned, but that the Scriptures every where mention the *Wiſdom*, *Goodneſs*, *Juſtice* and other *Attributes* of the Divine Being. But yet I am greatly at a Loſs to know what *Ideas* I ought to frame of theſe *Attributes*.

*P.* Have you any *Idea*, what either *Wiſdom*, or *Goodneſs*, or *Juſtice* means?

*C.* With reſpect to Man, I have a very clear one; but with regard to God, I have hardly any at all. In the former Caſe, I know they are attended with many *Defects* and *Imperfections*, with much *Weakneſs* and many *Errors*: and conſequently to transfer *ſuch Perfections*, tho' with the Addition of *Infinity*, to the Divine being, would certainly amount, (if any thing in the World does) to what a late learned Author calls, "The "putting together ſo many *infinite Imper-* "*fections* of the Creature, to make up our "complex Notion of the infinitely *perfect* "*Creator**."

*P.* Pray, my good Friend, can you recollect the Man, whoever propoſed to frame an

* The *Procedure*, &c. of *Human Underſtanding*, p. 452.

*Idea*

*Idea* of the *Divine Attributes*, by adding *Infinity* to *Human Wiſdom*, *Goodneſs* or *Juſtice* in conjunction with *Human Defects* and *Imperfections*, *Weakneſſes* and *Errors*? Whenever you meet with ſuch a one, charge him home with the groſs Immorality of ſuch an Attempt.

However, with reſpect to thoſe Terms, which you obſerve are frequently to be met with in the Sacred Writings, do you apprehend that they were deſign'd to convey ſome certain *Knowledge* to the Underſtanding; or were only to amuſe us, with mere *unintelligible* Sounds?

*C.* The former, undoubtedly. For to what Purpoſe, can we imagine it was, that *Divine Revelation* ſhould ſo often mention theſe Things to us, if it was abſolutely impoſſible to come by the Meaning of them? But yet I can't thoroughly ſatisfy my ſelf, what that meaning may be.

*P.* Suppoſe then, in order to judge of the Nature of theſe *Attributes*, we ſhould ſteddily retain the *Ideas* of what we underſtand by theſe *Perfections* in Mankind. I ſay keeping ſteddily to the *Ideas* of theſe *Perfections*: not uniting human *Defects* or *Miſtakes* or *Weakneſſes* with them; which would certain-

ly be, in the Language of your Author, *an unnatural hideous Compoſition*; * as well, I believe, as altogether *unthought* of, by any ſerious Writer whatever. But when we have in *Idea*, ſeparated all human *Droſs* from them, and conceiv'd them to be in the Deity, in the moſt *abſolute* and *perfect* Manner and Degree, without the leaſt *Failure* or *Deficiency*; I preſume, by this means, we may be enabled to think and ſpeak of the *Divine Attributes*, as becomes Men, who have the Light of *Reaſon* and *Revelation*.

And this I take to be Mr. *Lock*'s Meaning about forming *Ideas* of the *infinite Perfections* of God; though every one does not ſeem to have thus underſtood him †.

*C.* There is another Method propoſed by the learned Writer, I juſt mentioned, which ſeems to give us a much grander Conception of the *Attributes*.

But firſt, though he allows that our own Perfections " may become a *mediate*, *indi-*
" *rect*, and *analogical* Repreſentation of the
" *real*, *internal*, and *infinite Perfections* of
" the Divine Nature; ‡ yet our immediate
" conſcious *Conceptions* of the *Mind*, and all
" its Operations, together with all *Ideas* of

* Ibid. † Vindication of Mr. *Locke*, Dialog. 5.
‡ Procedure, &c. p. 448. —— 453.

" *Senſa-*

" *Senſation*, and the Terms expreſſing them, " in their firſt and proper Acceptation muſt " be removed from the Divine Nature, as " ſo many *Imperfections*, &c. —— And " whenever they are transferr'd to the Di- " vinity, it muſt be by *Analogy* only. —— " Theſe, when [thus] transferr'd to the Di- " vine Nature, do *denote* ſo many infinite " *unknown Perfections*, and are the very in- " gredients, which make up our complex " Notion of God" *. This Gentleman had before obſerved, that " by raiſing and tranſ- " ferring our Thoughts from the *literal* " *ſtrict Propriety* of thoſe Words, and " Phraſes, in which we expreſs immaterial " Heavenly Things, to that *analogical* Im- " port and Signification of them, they are " as it were *ſanctified* and *ſpiritualized*" †. And thus, I preſume, they " may denote and " *ſymbolize* ſome real correſpondent Perfections " of the Divinity" ‡.

*C.* Well, my good Friend, I think we are thus far agreed, that we may arrive at ſome *Knowledge* of the *Divine Attributes.* We don't ſeem indeed to propoſe coming at this Knowledge, exactly in the ſame Way and

* P. 454, 455. † P. 199. ‡ P. 456.

Manner

Manner. Your Author's Method has certainly the Advantage of *high ſounding* and very *pompous* Expreſſions. But what greater Degree of *Light* they may let into the Mind; or what *clearer* Senſe they may convey to the Underſtanding, are Subjects, which, I durſt believe, you will judge neceſſary to reflect on.

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SOME

SOME

# ENQUIRIES, &c.

## DIALOGUE III.

### *CEBES* and *PHÆDO.*

*C.* LET us reſt theſe Points upon the Foot, they ſtand at preſent; and next bend our Thoughts towards ſuch Beings, as come nearer to a Level with ourſelves. I ſometimes entertain myſelf with muſing on the Inhabitants of the *inviſible* World. It is a Subject indeed pretty agreeable to my own turn of Temper; though I can ſeldom come to any ſatisfactory Concluſion about it.

The

The Ancients, I know, are full of theſe inviſible Beings; but I incline to the Opinion of Mr. *Hobbes*, who thinks that "the "erroneous Collection [of Spirits] by the "Heathens, might proceed from the Ignorance of the Cauſe of *Ghoſts* and *Phantaſms*, and ſuch other Apparitions: From "whence the *Grecians* had their Number "of Gods, their Number of *Dæmons* good "or bad, and for every Man, his *Genius*. "Which is not, ſays he, the acknowledging "of this Truth, —— that *Spirits are*; but "a falſe Opinion concerning the Force of "Imagination" *.

*P.* Mr. *Hobbes* tells us in that very Place, "that the Heathens and all Nations of the "World *have acknowledged that there be* "*Spirits* †, which for the moſt Part they "hold to be incorporeal." However, a few Lines after, we are aſſured, that "This Hea"then Doctrine of Spirits, was not the ac"knowledging of this Truth, —— that *Spi*"*rits are*; but a falſe Opinion concerning "the Force of Imagination." All the World, it ſeems, *have* acknowledged, that *there be Spirits*; but *never* acknowledged this Truth, — that *Spirits are!*

* *Human Nature*, c. 11. p. 73. † See alſo the *Leviathan*, p. 37.

C. But

*C.* But does not Mr. *Hobbes* ſay, that their Doctrine of Spirits *proceeded from the Ignorance of the Cauſe of Ghoſts and Phantaſms*; and that the whole was but a falſe or miſtaken *Opinion*?

*P.* And how does all this, my good Friend, help the Matter?

How could their *Ignorance of the Cauſe of Spirits*; or a *falſe Opinion of the Force of Imagination*, or of any Thing elſe, hinder them from *acknowledging*, what they did *acknowledge*?

Mr. *Hobbes* might better have uſed his own jocoſe Diſtinction; and affirm'd, that the Heathens *acknowledged* Spirits *Tityricè*; but not *Tu patulicè* *.

Indeed that they entertain'd a thouſand *falſe* Opinions about theſe Beings, and ſometimes very *immoral* Ones, cannot be deny'd.

What, for Inſtance, could well be worſe, than the Doctrine of ſome of the *Perſian* † *Magi*, with regard to their *Principle* of Evil?

*C.* I am inclined to believe, that their Opinion, with reſpect to this *Principle*, has been generally miſunderſtood. —— It is true

* See his Diſcourſe on *Liberty* and *Neceſſity*, ſub finem.

† Vid. Notas *Iſaaci Caſaub.* ad *Diog. Laert.* de Vit. Philoſ. p. 1.

that *Plutarch* *, and *Diogenes Laertius* † both agree in ſpeaking of the two *Principles* of thoſe *Magi*. Each of theſe Writers mentioning the *Principle* of Good, under the Name of *Oromaſdes*; and the *Principle* of Evil, under that of *Arimanius*.

The chief Difference being only This, that whereas *Plutarch* calls the former a *God*, and the latter a *Dæmon*; The one is call'd the *Good*, and the other, the *Evil Dæmon*, by *Laertius*. However what can hinder us from ſuppoſing, that the *Magi* only deſign'd to *perſonate* Evil by *Arimanius*, juſt as the *Ægyptians* did by *Typhon*? And if this was really the Caſe, as the learned Doctor *Cudworth* thinks it might have been; here was no *ſubſtantial independent* Principle of Evil, as is frequently imagined; but a very harmleſs repreſentation of *Evil* itſelf.

The Doctor, indeed, rather thinks they meant by *Arimanius*, a *Satanical* Power, or Polity of evil *Dæmons* in the World, united together under one Head or Prince.

This he is pleaſed to judge probable, not only becauſe *Theodorus* in *Photius* calls the *Perſian Arimanius*, *Satanas*; but becauſe

* De Iſid. & Oſirid. p. 658. & in lib. de Procreat. Anim. in Timæo Plat. p. 1886. Edit. Hen. Steph. 1572.

† Procem. Lib. de Vit. Philoſoph. ſeg. 8.

thoſe

thoſe very Traditions of theirs, recorded by *Plutarch*, ſeem very much to favour this Notion. —— In theſe Traditions, *Arimanius* is call'd the " Introducer of Plagues and Fa-" mines; and the fatal Time is ſaid to be " near, when he will of Neceſſity be de-" ſtroy'd" *.

Theſe are the Doctor's Reaſons for his Opinion. But as that learned Gentleman does not ſuppoſe it likely, that the *Magi* ſhould intend by *Arimanius*, " a *Self-exiſtent* evil " *Dæmon*, a *ſubſtantial* evil Principle, *unmade* " and *independent* upon God; becauſe ſuch a " Being could never utterly be deſtroy'd †"; ſo am I, thus far, entirely of his Sentiments.

*P.* This was certainly a Blunder in their Hypotheſis; but no Proof, that ſuch a Doctrine was never held.

However, as it is certainly right to put a favourable Conſtruction upon every Thing that will bear it; let us examine how far your Expoſition will fairly agree with what the *Magi* expreſly taught.

In order to this, we muſt conſider, that they were divided into two different Sects. And whilſt " ſome held both thoſe *Princi-*

* De Iſide & Oſiride, p. 659. † Intellect. Syſtem, p. 222, 223.

"*ples* to have been from all Eternity; others "contended that the *Good* God only was "eternal, and that the other was created." *

This laſt Opinion, though capable of a very rational and good Meaning, could not however, one would think, but appear to the other *Magi* as overturning the very Reaſon, why they themſelves aſſerted an *eternal* Principle of Evil, which was, I preſume, both to ſolve the Difficulty, how Evil came firſt into the World; and to ſhew that Evil and Good did not ſpring from one and the ſame Original. You don't underſtand me, I am certain, as if I thought there was no other Way of giving a ſatisfactory Account of theſe Things: but I apprehend the Inventors of that Notion, ſtruck it out entirely with this View; and ſuppoſed it the beſt Solution of ſo intricate an Affair. This ſeems to be the Senſe of *Plutarch* upon this Subject †; who was indeed but too much prejudiced in favour of the Doctrine itſelf. —— And now, before we come to your Explanation of it, let us firſt try, whether that, which the learned *Cudworth* prefers, can poſſibly be reconciled

* *Prideaux's Connection*, Vol. 1. Part. 1. B. 3. p. 179. 8th *Edit.*

† Ἐι γὰρ οὐθὲν ἀναιτίως πέφυκε γενέσθαι, αἰτίαν δὲ κακοῦ τἀγαθὸν οὐκ ἂν παράσχοι, δεῖ γένεσιν ἰδίαν καὶ ἀρχὴν, ὥσπερ ἀγαθοῦ καὶ κακοῦ, τὴν φύσιν ἔχειν. De Iſid. & Oſirid. p. 658.

with

with the former of theſe Hypotheſes. His *Polity* of *Dæmons* under a *Head* or *Prince*, which *Head* or *Prince*, ſince he muſt himſelf, according to that Gentleman *, have been *created*, is a Suppoſition which cannot appear altogether conſiſtent with the *Eternity* of the ſame Being. For ſuppoſing that in *metaphyſical* ſtrictneſs, this was no Contradiction, (as you know Philoſophers are divided upon it;) yet it is expreſsly confounding theſe two different Sects together, and therefore, in Reaſon, cannot be admitted. However might they not, you will ſay, here *perſonate* Evil, by this *eternal* Principle, call'd *Arimanius*? I really imagine they could not. Becauſe upon this Suppoſition, they give no Account at all, of the Origin of *Evil* itſelf; which was what they manifeſtly deſign'd to do. —— To ſay that ſome *real* Being was the Cauſe of *Evil*, is, ſo far, talking intelligibly. But to affirm, that *Evil* ow'd its Original to *itſelf*, either in Time, or from Eternity, is ſuch an Aſſertion, as ought not to be charg'd on any Philoſophers, without proper Evidence.

Again, let us take a ſhort View, what Succeſs the ſame Suppoſition is like to meet

* Intell. Syſtem, p. 222.

with

with amongſt thoſe *Magi*, who maintain'd this *Principle* to have been *created:* and who might therefore very conſiſtently pronounce, it would be finally *deſtroy'd*. And here the Queſtion is, whether they ſpeak of the *Creation* and *Deſtruction* of a *Subſtance*, or not? Of a *real* Being; or only of a *Property* or *Quality* of ſuch a Being? They might indeed poſſibly mean the latter; but whether it be very reaſonable to think ſo, muſt be left to your own Reflections.

However, we muſt further obſerve, that a conſiderable Alteration was made in the Ancient *Magian* Religion, many Ages after, by *Zoroaſter*; who introduced a "*Principle* ſu-"perior to both the others; one ſupreme "God, who created both Light and Dark-"neſs." And this Doctrine he explain'd ſo, as to avoid making God the Author of Evil. For he taught, "that God originally and di-"rectly created only Light or Good, and that "Darkneſs or Evil follow'd it by Conſe-"quence, as the Shadow doth the Perſon. "That Light or Good had only a real Pro-"duction from God, and the other after-"wards reſulted from it, as the Defect "thereof *."

* *Prideaux's Connection*, V. I. Part. I. B. 4. p. 214, 215.

It

It is true indeed that a learned Writer maintains this to be contrary to what the Ancients tell us: and he quotes *Plutarch* as a Voucher for his Opinion *.

It muſt be own'd that *Plutarch* is not only ſilent as to this Reformation; but even that he mentions *Zoroaſter*, as one who held the ſame Opinion of two *Principles*, in common with the other *Magians* †. But ſtill notwithſtanding, whether that Reformation altogether eſcaped the Diligence of that great Man; or whether he here ſpeaks of a different *Zoroaſter* ‡; or whatever elſe might be the Reaſon, that we meet not with it in his Writings, there are however great Authorities to

* Il y a des Perſons qui ont ſoutenu que les deux Principes que Zoroaſtre admettoit, n' étoient pas des Cauſes premieres, mais avoient été produits par un Dieu Superieur. Ce ſentiment a été embraſſé avec ardeur par M. Hyde; [*Hiſt. Relig. Vet. Perſar.* c. 9. p. 163. c. 22. p. 299] mais il eſt abſolument oppoſé à tout ce que les Anciens nous rapportent, il paroit bien par Plutarque que les Poëtes, ou Mythologiſtes Perſans, croyoient qu' *Arimanius*, le Dieu du Mal, ſeroit détruit, après de longs Combats, mais *Oromaſdes* ne connoiſſoit point de Superieur; & ni lui, ni ſon Adverſaire, n'avoient point été produits par un même & ſouverain Principe. *Hiſtoire de la Philoſophie payenne*, Tome premier, p. 120.

† De Iſid. & Oſirid, p. 658.

‡ Magorum Princeps & Coryphæus erat Zoroaſter, ut multi teſtantur Authores; ſed in hujus Zoroaſtri vel Zoroaſtrorum Hiſtoriâ parùm conveniunt. Alii unum, alii duos, alii mukos conſtituunt. —— Sed inter multa confuſè dicta ab Antiquis circa Zoroaſtros, conſtare videtur primò, duos fuiſſe, minimùm, Zoroaſtros, utroſque Sapientiæ Nomine & Doctrinæ Magicæ,

ſupport

ſupport the Belief of ſuch a different Syſtem *. And from what we have juſt mention'd of it, there would have been ſome ground to think, that *Zoroaſter* deſign'd only to *perſonate* Evil by this new *Principle*; ſince in one Place he ſeems to make no more of it, than a mere *Defect* of Goodneſs. But as he elſewhere calls it, "the Angel of Darkneſs, who is the "Author and Director of all Evil" †, I am apprehenſive that, even here, the Critics will not admit of my Friend's Expoſition. However, be this as it will, I believe it muſt be allow'd, that ſome of the more ancient *Magi* maintain'd two *ſubſtantial* Principles, the one of Good, and the other of Evil, to have exiſted from all Eternity: and that the latter would be utterly deſtroy'd. And though it be certain, that what relates to the *Principle* of Evil, is exceedingly groſs; yet where there is ſufficient Evidence, that ſuch a Tenet was held, the Inconſiſtency or Contradiction of any of its Parts, will not leſſen the Proof of the Fact itſelf. And I know very little Labour is

celebres. ——— Conſtare mihi videtur, horum duorum res, ætates, dogmata, patrias, ſcripta, alia, ſæpe confundi & permiſceri, tam ab antiquis quàm à recentioribus. *Burnetii Archæolog. Philoſoph.* L. 1. c. 5. p. 35.

* See the learned Dean *Prideaux*, in loc. proximè citat.

† Idem, *ibid.*

wanting

wanting to ſatisfy you, that the Notion is not only abſurd, but highly immoral.

*C.* You really judge very right. I take the Abſurdity and Immorality of it to be ſo great, that I am very loth to think thoſe ancient *Perſians* guilty of it. Men, "whoſe whole "Worſhip, ſays a great Author, if compared "with the Superſtitions of other Nations, "ought to be called *Philoſophical* —— *Pure* "and *Simple*" *.

*P.* Well, my Friend, without being over-critical †, let us determine, that *their Worſhip was greatly preferable to their Belief.*

*C.* If no better Terms can be afforded, let us paſs on to conſider another Paſſage in Dr. *Cudworth*, where he mentions a famous old Opinion, relating to an infinite Number of inviſible Beings, of different *Qualities*, *Orders*, and *Degrees* ‡.

This, I muſt own, is a very ingenious Hypotheſis; but then ſo many fooliſh Notions

* Quin & totus Perſarum Cultus, ſi reliquarum gentium ſuperſtitionibus conferatur, Philoſophicus dici meretur. —— And after a Quotation from *Herodotus*, he adds, —— Ita coluerunt Deos Perſæ, præ cæteris populis, caſtè, & ſine fuco. *Archæolog. Philoſoph.* L. 1. c. 5. p. 37., 38.

† Scio nonnulla narrari aliter de Perſis à Strabone, ſed vel diverſas eorum ſectas reſpicit, vel diverſa ſæcula. *Idem, ibid.*

‡ *Intellect. Syſtem*, p. 226, *&c.*

have ariſen from it, that I am almoſt out of Conceit with the Thing itſelf.

*P.* Well then, ſhall we ſay, that amongſt all the Works of God, it is unlikely there ſhould be any Rank of Beings, of Superior Dignity to Man? Shall we ſuppoſe, that the human Soul is the higheſt of all created Spirits; and conſequently at the upper End of the whole Creation?

*C.* Indeed, when I reflect on the Scale of Beings in that Part of the Univerſe, where we now are; and at the Top of which Mankind appears to be, I am almoſt inclined to think, with a late fine Writer, that there may be alſo a Scale of Beings, who far exceed us *.

*P.* Truly, *Cebes*, I dont apprehend, that any ſatisfactory Reaſon can be aſſign'd for the contrary. "Such Variety and Excellen-" cy (ſays a great Philoſopher) being ſuitable " to the Wiſdom and Power of the Maker"†. And elſewhere, he propoſes it to the Reader's Thoughts, "How inconſiderable a Rank, " the Spirits that inhabit our Bodies, hold " amongſt thoſe various, and poſſibly innu-" merable, Kinds of nobler Beings; and how

* *Religion of Nature delineated*, § 5. N. 5.

† *Locke's* Hum. Underſtand. B. 2. c. 2. § 3.

" far

"far ſhort they come of the Endowments "and Perfections of *Cherubims* and *Seraphims*, "and infinite Sorts of Spirits above us" *. I really think, my Friend, that ſuch kind of Reflections muſt greatly tend to raiſe and enlarge the Mind, and to inſpire us with an awful Senſe of the amazing Power of God.

*C.* Would Men but confine theſe Reflections, as they ought; there could poſſibly lye no manner of Objection againſt them.

*P.* You will, I preſume, further allow, that let Creatures be of never ſo high a Rank, it is not abſolutely impoſſible, but they may deviate from the great Laws of their Being. For as all *moral* Agents *muſt* have Liberty; ſo Liberty *may* be abuſed. And conſequently according to their Behaviour, they will neceſſarily be denominated either *good* or *bad*.

*C.* However, let us not graft any ſuperſtitious Fancies upon theſe Suppoſitions.

*P.* That, my Friend, would be no manner of Ornament or Advantage to them.

*C.* I am ſenſible that Men, who are accuſtom'd to ſwallow every Thing, they meet with amongſt the Ancients, may be inclined to imagine, that certain of thoſe Beings are

* B. 4. c. 3. § 17. See alſo B. 2. c. 10. § 9. B. 3. c. 6. § 12.

appointed as ſo many *Deputy Governors* over the Univerſe: ſome of thoſe old Writers being full of their *local Tutelary Deities.* But ſuch blind Adorers of the Ancients, don't always conſider, how many Doctrines they taught in *Public*, which they untaught in *Private.*

*P.* However, I durſt ſay, you won't care to reſt the Merits of this Opinion, upon its having been only a *publick* Doctrine *. But then I dont mean the Opinion, as it is often to be met with; but as it is capable of being rationally explain'd.

*C.* Let it be explain'd as it can: and let the Ancients have believ'd it ever ſo firmly; I cannot ſee one Reaſon for the Opinion.— We are told indeed, that Creatures may have Leave or Power given them. But pray to what Purpoſe are ſuch Leave and Power given to the Creatures? "Do we apprehend, "ſays a learned Foreigner, that it would be "too troubleſome for the Creator to take "the whole Care of Things upon himſelf "alone, without the Aid or Aſſiſtance of "others †"? I ſhould really be glad to know,

* See Mr. *Warburton*'s *Divine Legation of* Moſes, Edit. 2. p. 148. Note [t]. Where he obſerves that what the ἀπόῤῥητα [or Doctrine of the *greater Myſteries*] overthrew, was the vulgar *Polytheiſm* or Worſhip of dead Men.

† *Le Monde enchanté*, L. 2. c. 3. § 10.

what

what it is, that finite Creatures *can* do, which the infinite Creator is not able to do without them.

*P.* Nothing, moſt certainly, *Cebes.*

*C.* Well then, it muſt derogate from the Power of God, to ſuppoſe He wants any Being whatever, either to convey his Meſſages, or to ſuperintend any Part of his Works?

*P.* Undoubtedly it muſt.

*C.* Then let us conclude, they are not employ'd.

*P.* That Concluſion, my Friend, comes rather too haſtily.

There is ſurely no doubt to be made, but the Almighty *can* cheriſh and enlighten the whole Univerſe, and provide for all the Wants and Neceſſities of every Creature, by his bare Decree only. However this hinders not, but he brings about the wiſe Diſpenſations of his ſacred Providence, by ſecond and inferior Cauſes; by the Miniſtry and Agency of various ſubordinate Inſtruments. And therefore if this does not derogate from the Power of God, how can the executing any other Part of his divine Will, though by *inviſible* Agents, or *ſuperior* Beings, appear to leſſen his Omnipotence? It is not indeed to be ſuppoſed, that the Almighty makes uſe of his Creatures, becauſe he ſtands in need of their Service,

Service; but only becauſe it may be perfectly ſuitable to the State and Circumſtances they are in. And ſurely to uſe every Being according to the true Nature of it, is highly conſiſtent, not only with the infinite *Power*; but alſo with the infinite *Wiſdom* of God.

*C.* And yet the learned Author, I juſt quoted, thinks it "impoſſible for the Deity to "give to the moſt Noble Order of Beings, "ſuch Power as would be ſufficient for di-"recting or governing any Part of his "Works"*.

*P.* Pray, for what Reaſon?

*C.* "Becauſe he that has made all Things, "and who therefore is the Maſter of all, has "alone the Right and Power of governing all. "And becauſe it is impoſſible for him to "cauſe a *Creature*, in a Manner, to ceaſe to "be ſuch, or to become the *Creator*" †.

*P.* That God alone has an abſolute, independent, and uncontroulable Right and Power to govern all Things, is undoubtedly as evident, as that he is. And that he has, for this very Reaſon, an indiſputable Right and Power to conſtitute whom he pleaſes under him, for directing or governing any Part of his Works, is, to me, equally evident. But how this

* *Le Monde enchanté*, L. 2. c. 3. § 9. † *Ibid.*

comes

comes to require no leſs a Change, than turning a *Creature* into the *Creator*, (as this Gentleman ſeems to maintain *) I muſt frankly own, I cannot comprehend.

*C.* My Author readily allows, that "Man "is a kind of Vice-God upon Earth, and as "ſuch, that he governs the earthly Creatures; "becauſe he was appointed to this, by the "Creator himſelf. However he ſuppoſes that "Man can do nothing, but as Nature allows "or permits; and that he can make no al-"teration in that, nor one Hair of his Head "either black or white" †.

*P.* If that Gentleman only means, that "no created Being, whether on Earth or "elſewhere, can have any Rule or Power, "but by the Leave or Appointment of his "Creator; that ſuch Being can make no "Alteration in the great Laws of Nature; but "muſt ever depend on the Sovereign Au-"thor of it, and be under certain Reſtraints "and Limitations"; — I ſay, if this be all that is meant, the ingenious Author is undoubtedly right; but then it is hard to ſay, what this is brought to prove. But if he de-

* Car il ne peut pas donner à ſa propre Creature ce qu'il êt lui-même, & faire en ſorte que ce qui êt une Creature ne ce ſoit pas. *ibid.*

† Ibid.

ſigns to affirm, that, " excepting here on " Earth, God Almighty cannot delegate whom " he pleaſes to govern any Part of his Works; " or cannot furniſh ſuch with ſufficient Power " to this Purpoſe; becauſe the Creature wou'd, " by this Means, ceaſe, in a Manner, to be " what he is; and would even become what " his great Creator is"; — then I beg Leave to think, that nothing could be more weakly ſaid.

*C.* But does he not juſtly obſerve, that " how advantageouſly ſoever the ancient Phi- " loſophers ſpeak of the Sovereign Divinity; " yet they having divided the Government " of the Univerſe amongſt many Gods, and " aſſign'd to each his proper Adminiſtra- " tion; they by this means, neither aſcribe " Independency to the Deity, nor the imme- " diate Direction of all Things" *.

*P.* If we ſuppoſe the Almighty has ſeen proper to commit the *immediate* Direction of ſome Things (be they more or leſs) to ſuch of his Creatures, as he knows to be equal to the Taſk; and if ſuch Creatures are ſuppoſed to hold their reſpective Adminiſtrations, only at the Will and Pleaſure of the Supream Being; then is it impoſſible to diſcern, how this can rob the Almighty of his *Independency.*

* L. 1. c. 2. § 4.

Indeed,

Indeed, if any Philoſophers, either ancient or modern, have made that Divine Being *dependent* on his Creatures; they have been guilty of great Folly and Wickedneſs. But no one is to be charged with this, from barely ſuppoſing, that God, for infinitely wiſe Reaſons, may often make uſe of their Service and Miniſtry.

*C.* But is not the committing the Care and Government of the Univerſe to ſuch Beings, contradictory to the Notion of a watchful Providence ſuperintending the Affairs of the whole Creation? Does not this Suppoſition open a Way to the *Epicurean* Doctrine, that Things are left to run on by themſelves, without any Care or Concern of the Deity; who is not diſpoſed to attend, in any Meaſure, to them?

*P.* Whoever ſo aſcribes the Government of the Univerſe, to the Direction of inferior Agents, as to exclude the Supreme Being from concerning himſelf about the Affairs of his Creatures, (even the meaneſt of them) thinks highly unworthy of God: and ſeems to charge him with the Indolence and Careleſneſs of the *Epicurean* Deities. But ſurely the Almighty may conduct the Affairs of the Univerſe, by the Miniſtry of his Creatures, without being

indifferent, whether thoſe Affairs go on right or wrong. He may, without all Queſtion, bring about the great Deſigns of his Providence, by means of ſecond Cauſes, and yet the whole ought as much to be aſcrib'd to him, as if no inferior Agency had been uſed. In ſhort, he may rule and govern the whole Creation, and every Part of it, by an infinite Variety of ſubordinate Beings, and yet, at the ſame time, ſuperintend and watch the whole himſelf. Thus making uſe of his Creatures, in ſuch different Ways and Methods, as beſt anſwer the Ends of their Creation; as are moſt ſuited to the Rank and Station they are in, and to thoſe reſpective Duties, which they owe the Supreme Being; and yet be himſelf no unconcern'd or negligent Spectator.

But whilſt he conſtantly ſupports the whole Frame of Nature by his Almighty Power; orders every Thing in the beſt Manner, and to the beſt Purpoſes, by his infinite Wiſdom; and takes Care of all his Creatures, by his diffuſive and univerſal Goodneſs; it is not the making uſe of inferior Inſtruments, Agents, or Miniſters, who are themſelves under his immediate Inſpection, Rule, and Government, that can, in any Meaſure or Degree, leſſen that

that kind and tender Providence, which is conſtantly *over all his Works.*

*C.* I hope too, my Friend, that now and then, they are ſent in whole Troops to our lower Regions: Or how ſhall we be able to account for thoſe conſtant *Apparitions*, which every old Houſe and Caſtle is ſo liable to?

*P.* What a weak or diſtemper'd Mind may picture to itſelf, I think we have nothing to do with. A Perſon of your Underſtanding will always find the proper *Medium*, between believing *every thing*, and believing *nothing*.

*C.* But now, ſuppoſing it poſſible for one of theſe Beings to become viſible; how can we be able to ſatisfy ourſelves, that we are not deceiv'd? For I durſt ſay you will agree to what the learn'd *Dutch* Profeſſor affirms, "That Men very often, from a par-"ticular diſpoſition of the Blood and Spirits, "may ſee *Ghoſts* and *Hobgoblins*, which are "nothing but the Off-ſpring of their own "Fancy" *.

*P.* There is no queſtion, but there may be many of the ſame Caſt with the famous Knight of *la Mancha*, who turn'd *Wind-Mills* into *Giants*; and *Flocks* of *Sheep* into *Armies* of *Men.* But is a Perſon therefore

* L. 2. c. 32. § 12. l. 3. c. 22. § 9.

never to believe his Senſes? What think you, *Cebes*, are we now *really* converſing; or is it all *Deluſion?*

*C.* We are converſing, moſt certainly.

*P.* Then you would take that Man to be under a *Deluſion* himſelf, who offer'd to diſpute it?

*C.* I ſhould, indeed.

*P.* And yet you know, there has been a Sect of Philoſophers, who would not have ſcrupled it.

*C.* And I, in my turn, would not have ſcrupled to laugh at ſuch a Piece of extravagant *Scepticiſm.*

*P.* Well, then, my Friend, our *Senſes*, under the Conduct and Direction of *Reaſon*, ought to have a great Regard paid to them.

*C.* They ought, undoubtedly. And had *Reaſon* been always the Guide, I believe many a voluminous Hiſtory might have been compriz'd in a *Nut Shell.*

*P.* I dont conteſt it.

*C.* In my Opinion, that great Philoſopher and Hiſtorian *Plutarch* lays too much Streſs upon what is reported to have appear'd both to *Dion* and *Brutus.*

*P. Plutarch* indeed ſeems plainly to think, that ſome Credit may be given to the Report of thoſe two grave Philoſophers.

*C.* But

*C.* But how often may any Philoſopher whatever fancy himſelf *awake*, when he is *faſt aſleep?*

*P.* Well, my Friend, ſhall we therefore conclude, that every Philoſopher is certainly *faſt aſleep*, whenever he takes himſelf to be *broad awake?*

*C.* Not ſo neither.

*P.* Why then *Plutarch* might poſſibly be right, in giving Credit to two ſuch Men as *Dion* and *Brutus.*

*C.* With regard to the *Phantom* ſeen by the latter, I really think that Mr. *Hobbes* does account for it very naturally. —— "*Brutus*, "ſays he, ſitting in his Tent, penſive and "troubled with the Horror of his raſh Act, "it was not hard for him, ſlumbering in the "Cold, to dream of that which moſt affright-"ed him; which Fear, as by Degrees it made "him wake; ſo alſo it muſt needs make the "Apparition by Degrees to vaniſh; —— and "having no Aſſurance that he ſlept, he could "have no Cauſe to think it a Dream, or any "Thing but a Viſion" *.

*P.* Mr. *Hobbes* poſſibly judged of *Brutus*, by what he might apprehend would have befallen himſelf, in the ſame Circumſtances.

* *Leviath.* Part. 1. c. 2.

That

That is, in caſe Mr. *Hobbes* had been *ſlumbering in a cold Tent, and troubled with the Horror of any raſh Act*, he could not have diſtinguiſhed between a *Dream* and an *Apparition*. But the Misfortune is, (at leaſt, as far as I remember) that Mr. *Hobbes* no where acquaints us, from whence he pick'd up all the Particulars of this extraordinary Narrative.

*Plutarch* not only affirms that *Brutus* " was " *not* aſleep; but that he was by Nature, *ex-* " *ceedingly watchful*, and was then employ- " ing his Thoughts about the approaching " War" *.

And moreover *horrible* and *ſhocking* as the Fact undoubtedly was; yet was *Brutus* ſo far from being *troubled* or *affrighted* at it, that even after this *Dream*, he tells *Caſſius*, that " ſince the Ides of *March*, he had led a Life " *free* and *glorious*" †. So very *probable* is the Hiſtory, which Mr. *Hobbes* has favour'd us with! Beſides I beg leave further to obſerve, that *Brutus* not only *dreamt* he heard a Voice which thus accoſted him, —— *I am thy Evil*

* Ὀυ καθεύδων, ἀλλὰ φροντίζων περὶ τοῦ μέλλοντος (λέγεται γὰρ οὗτος ἀνὴρ ἥκιστα δὴ τῶν στρατηγῶν ὑπνώδης γενέσθαι, καὶ πλεῖστον ἑαυτῷ χρόνον ἐγρηγορότι χρῆσθαι πεφυκώς). In vit. Cæſaris, p. 1359.

† Μαρτίαις εἰδοῖς δὺς τῇ Παρίδι τὸν ἐμαυτοῦ βίον, ἀλλ' ὃν ἔζησα δι' ἐκεῖνον ἐλεύθερον καὶ ἔνδοξον. *Idem*, in vit. Brut. p. 1833.

*Genius*,

*Genius, Thou ſhalt ſee me near* Philippi*; but how ſoon after this, did the unfortunate *Brutus* there fall by his own Sword †: if not by the *very* Sword, that murder'd *Cæſar* ‡? ſo juſt was the Remark of the great Hiſtorian, that "*the Deed was manifeſtly diſpleaſing to the Gods*" ‖.

*C.* However, this is certain, that *Brutus* was ſatisfied, after *Caſſius* had perſuaded him, that the whole was a mere *Deluſion* †.

*P. Caſſius* reaſon'd, as he uſed to do, upon the Principles of the *Epicurean* Philoſophy, which was in Subſtance "that *there is no* "*truſting to the Senſes*". And in particular he obſerves to *Brutus*, that "*his Body being*, "*in a Manner, worn out by Toil and Labour*, "*muſt greatly affect and diſorder his Mind:* "But aſſures him, *there was no ſuch Beings*, "*as his Imagination ſuggeſted*".

Nor is it any Wonder if *Brutus* ſuffer'd himſelf to be overcome by ſuch Reaſonings. For notwithſtanding that high ſpirited *Roman*

* Ὁ σὸς, ὦ Βροῦτε, δαίμων κακός· ὄψει δέ με περὶ Φιλίππους. *Ibid.* p. 1830.

† *Ibid.* p. 1844.

‡ Nonnulli [Percuſſorum] ſemet eodem illo Pugione, quo Cæſarem violaverant, interemerunt. *Sueton.* in Vit. Jul. Cæſaris, fine. See alſo Dean *Prideaux*'s Connection, Part 2. B. 7. p. 502.

‖ Τὸ Βρούτῳ γενόμενον φάσμα ὑπὸ Καίσαρος ἐδήλωσε σφαλὲν ὃ γενόμενον θεοῖς ἀρεστόν. In vit. Cæſ. p. 1359.

† *Plut.* in vit. *Brut.* p. 1831.

behaved

behaved with a Presence of Mind peculiar to himself; yet that this Affair made some impression upon him, is evident from his being afterwards *calm'd* or *composed* by the Arguments of *Cassius* *.

He was plainly terrified by this *imaginary* Phantom; and therefore was glad of any Relief. But then, when *Cassius* used those Arguments, the Tragedy was not yet compleated. *Brutus* had only receiv'd his Summons, and just promised to comply with it. So that here was yet room to flatter him, that he was certainly mistaken. However, when the whole Affair seem'd afterwards to be clear'd up, by the fatal Issue of Things; perhaps even *Cassius* himself, had he survived it, might have thought of a more *Philosophical* Solution than he had given before. He would not, I think, have attempted to account for so remarkable an Event, by *the deception of the Senses, and the Mind's forming Ideas at Pleasure, by the Mind's being in perpetual Motion, and influenced by a Body quite broke with Cares.*

I dont know whether this might not appear so mean and childish to Mr. *Hobbes*, that

* Τοιούτοις μὲν ὁ Κάσσιος ἐπραΰνε λόγοις τὸν Βροῦτον. *Ibid.* *Plutarch* in another Place, says that he was *shock'd* at first. ἐκπλαγεὶς δὲ τὸ πρῶτον. In vit. Cæsaris, p. 1359.

rather

rather than offer ſuch a Solution, he choſe rather to give us a new Hiſtory, and to leave the Event to ſhift for itſelf.

*C.* Whatever Mr. *Hobbes* might think of that Solution; the ingenious Foreigner ſeems to apprehend that "the different Motion of "*Atoms* will account for moſt of the *Phan-* "*toms* that have made their Appearance in "the World"*.

*P.* That honeſt Gentleman was ſo greatly diſpleas'd at the many *Fairy-Tales* he had met with; that he ſeemed determined to ruin the Reputation of every *Spectre* that came in his Way.

*Lucretius*, you know, endeavours to account for theſe Things, in much the ſame Manner †. But he, you are ſenſible, was a

* Nous allons voir maintenant, s'il eſt bien jamais arrivé dans le Monde quelque choſe de la Nature de celles que l'on appelle Apparition de Fantome, ou Magie, que l'on ne doive attribuer à ces Atômes; qui, bien ſouvent, en ſe mouvant, en ſe ſeparant, ou en ſe joignant les uns aux autres, peuvent faire les mêmes aſpects, les mêmes ſons, les mêmes mouvemens dans les Hommes & autour d'eux, que l'on attribue aux Eſprits.—— *Le Monde enchanté*, L. 4. c. 2. § 11.

† ——— Rerum ſimulacra vocamus:
Quæ quaſi membranæ ſummo de Corpore rerum
Derepiæ volitant ultro citróque per Auras:
Atque eadem nobis vigilantibus obvia menteis
Terrificant; atque in ſomnis, cùm ſæpe figuras
Contuimur miras ſimulacráque luce carentum;
Quæ nos horrificè languenteis ſæpe ſopore
Excierunt. ——— L. 4. ℣. 34, *&c.*

very great Undertaker. He ſolves every Difficulty in Nature, by the help of his *Atoms*; juſt as *Don Quixot* ſolv'd all Appearances by his *Necromancers*. Nothing was ever found too hard for either.

But whether there be not ſomething of *Knight-Errantry* in all *ſuch* Philoſophical Attempts, you will perhaps, when at Leiſure, reflect with yourſelf.

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SOME

SOME

# ENQUIRIES, *&c.*

## DIALOGUE IV.

### *CEBES* and *PHÆDO.*

*C.* BE thoſe Things as they will, I can't however avoid being greatly ſurpriz-ed, to obſerve ſome Gentlemen of very great Freedom, giving into Opinions, which appear to me quite groundleſs, and ro-mantic. I am ſometimes almoſt tempted to think, that they really meant no more, than the great *Pythagoras* did, when he aſcribed the Cauſe of Earth-quakes to a *Convention* of

*Ghosts* *. Tho' indeed, on the other hand, the Manner in which they express themselves, would rather incline us to believe, they were perfectly serious and in earnest.

*P.* Pray, what may these extraordinary Opinions be, which thus astonish my Friend?

*C.* I shall mention them and their Authors, just as they occur to my Thoughts, without observing, who ought to have the Precedency.

To begin then with a learned Countryman of our own, who has employ'd about five Folio Pages, to prove that the *Devil* is one great Cause of *Error* in the World †. So that in a Book, expresly design'd to correct *vulgar Errors*, the Author seems to me, to have run into a very gross one himself.

That excellent Wit, *Mons. Bayle*, appears to have been possess'd by much the same visionary Notions ‡.

The learned *Cudworth* is pleas'd to tell us, in his *intellectual System*, that "It is not to "be doubted, but it was an evil *Dæmon*, "that deliver'd Oracles in the Temple of *Se-* "*rapis*, as well as elsewhere amongst the

* Σύνοδον τῶν τεθνεώτων, *Ælian.* var. Hist. L. 4. cap. 17.
† Dr. *Brown's vulgar Errors*, L. 1. c. 10.
‡ *Pensées diverses*, Tom. 1. § 68.

"*Pagans*,

" *Pagans*, however he affected to be wor-
" ſhip'd as the ſupream God" *.

Much to the ſame Purpoſe ſpeaks the famous *Grotius* †. And even Dr. *Burnet* himſelf ſeems to have been as far gone in theſe ſuperſtitious Fancies, as any other.

He talks, in one Place, of " the Heathen
" Nations being ſubject to the Dominion and
" Rule of that evil *Genius* or *Spirit*, who
" had made himſelf a *Prince* of this World" ‡. Again, mentioning the horrible Rites of thoſe People, he thus remarks, —— " Nor do I
" think, ſays he, that ſuch Things are alto-
" gether to be imputed to human Nature:
" For I do not doubt in the leaſt, but *evil*
" *Spirits* did contribute greatly to the ſow-
" ing, cultivating and encreaſing this Kind of
" Errors amongſt the Heathen" ‖.

And much to the ſame Purpoſe, he elſewhere affirms, that " he readily agrees with
" thoſe, who declare that Men were firſt
" taught *Magic* and *Aſtrology* by *Evil Spi-*
" *rits*; they ſeeming to be Inventions or
" Dotages beyond any Thing human" ⸸. — *Such Dotages*, *Phædo*, from *ſuch Men*, I expected not!

* P. 351. † De verit. Relig. Chriſt. L. 4. c. 3.
‡ De Fide & Officiis Chriſt. p. 44. ‖ *Ibid.* p. 24.
⸸ Archæol. Philoſoph. L. 1. c. 8. p. 142.

*P.* We are apt, *Cebes*, when we have a very high Opinion of any Perſon's Abilities, to be ſomething alarm'd at their entertaining Sentiments different from our own; eſpecially in very *favourite* Points.

*C.* 'Tis the Reaſonableneſs of a Man's Opinions, and not the Rank he may juſtly bear in the learned World, that ſhall ever ſway or influence me.

*P.* You are perfectly right, my Friend, for the greateſt of Men, are but Men ſtill, and therefore liable to Error.

*C.* And *Error*, is *Error* ſtill; let it have the Patronage of never ſuch great Names.—And though the Cauſes of it may be very various; yet whether it proceeds from Inadvertency, Superſtition, or the Prejudices of Education, I would equally avoid it. And as I take the reigning Opinions, concerning the *Devil*, to be owing to ſome or other of theſe Cauſes, I muſt frankly own myſelf a kind of Infidel, with regard to that *Being*.

*P.* Where Opinions, *Cebes*, have no better Support, it is no wonder that a wiſe Man ſhould not be over forward to embrace them. How far this may be the preſent Caſe, will be worth while to enquire.

*C.* I very readily allow, that after the *Baby-*

*loniſh*

*byloniſh* Captivity, the Heads of the *Jews* were full of *ſuch Beings*, as appears from their Writers both ancient and modern *; but yet I cannot conceive what Neceſſity there is, why *Satan* and *Diabolus*, the one of *Hebrew* and the other of *Greek* Extraction, muſt ſo frequently be ſuppoſed in the *New Teſtament*, to refer to ſome certain *inviſible Being*. Why may not theſe Terms be as well apply'd to any human Creature, who deſerves the Name of an *Adverſary* or an *Accuſer*? And thus, I think, in like Manner, the *Tempter*, the *Evil One*, and the *Prince of the Power of the Air*, *may with great* Propriety be all uſed of Mankind.

*P.* And yet theſe Names may happen to be ſo circumſtanced, as plainly to point at ſuch an *inviſible Being*, as you mention. And it appears to me ſo very evident, that theſe Names are thus appropriated in ſome Places, at leaſt, of the *New Teſtament* †; that whoſoever ſees it not, muſt either take a ſingular Pleaſure in turning the plain literal Senſe of

* Wiſd. of Sol. Chap. ii. 24. Joſeph. Antiq. L. 7. c. 2. L. 8. c. 2. Targ. of Jonath. on *Gen.* iii. 6. Maimon. in Duct. Dubit. ii. 3. More Nevochim, L. 3. c. 47. R. Dav. Kimchi, in lib. Radicum, in voc. *Sehirim*, mention'd *Lev.* xvii. 7. — Pirke Avoth, c. 36. See alſo *Selden* de Diis Syris Syntag. c. 2.

† Matt. iv. 1. compared with Mark, i. 13. Matt. xiii. 19, 39, compared with Mark iv. 15, and Luke viii. 12. See alſo Luke xi. 18. chap. xxii. 31. John viii. 44. Epheſ. ii. 2. chap. vi. 11. 1 Pet. v. 8. 1 John ii. 13, 14. chap. iii. 8, 10, 12. chap. v. 18.

Words

Words into Figure and Allegory; or he muſt ſuppoſe that ſuch literal Senſe is inconſiſtent with the plain Principles of Reaſon, or the whole Tenor of Revelation.

*C.* That is my very Caſe, *Phædo.* I cannot underſtand the Words of inſpired Writers in any Senſe, that contradicts the very firſt Principles of Reaſon and Religion. Hence ariſes my oppoſition to the literal Meaning of thoſe Scriptures; I have no other Objection to it at all.

*P.* Upon a Suppoſition then, that the Notion of ſuch a Being is found neither contrary to Reaſon or Religion, you are ready to acquieſce in the literal Senſe?

*C.* I may venture to promiſe it.

*P.* Well then, my Friend, we here join Iſſue.

*C.* It is agreed. And I begin with mentioning the Thoughts of the learn'd *Dutch* Profeſſor on this Subject. —— "Men have, "ſays he, puſh'd Matters ſo far as to the "Power of the Devil, that it is become an "Article of Piety to attribute abundance of "miraculous Effects to him. And thoſe Men "are accounted raſh and impious, who can-"not believe him to do every Thing, which "a thouſand Witneſſes affirm that he actually "does.

" does. So that at preſent, it is a Part of " Religion, to join the Fear of God, with the " Fear of the Devil. —— To deny this, is to " be eſteem'd an *Atheiſt*; though a Man is " only guilty of not believing two Gods, a " Good and a Bad"*.

Again, " When I compare, ſays he, with " the *Analogy* of the whole Scripture, with " the Fundamentals of our Divinity, and " with the Rules of true Piety, all thoſe " Things that are commonly publiſhed in " relation to the Knowledge, Power, and " Operations of the Devil; his Apparitions " in divers Parts of the World; and his Do- " minion and Kingdom, which exalt them- " ſelves againſt the Kingdom of *Jeſus Chriſt*; " I dont only conclude, that they are not " founded on thoſe three Principles; but, " when duly conſidered, that they appear di- " rectly contrary to them" †. In another Place, he obſerves, that " whoſoever abſo- " lutely believes, what is commonly attri- " buted to the Devil and his Angels, cannot " have any convincing Proof, that *Jeſus* is " the *Chriſt*, or that there is but one God" ‖.

*P.* All theſe Reflections may be allow'd to be very juſt; but yet I can't conceive what

* Pref. gener. ſub finem. † Abrégé de tout l'ouvrage, circa medium. ‖ L. 1. c. 1. § 3.

 inſur-

inſurmountable Difficulties can ariſe from a Suppoſition of an *Evil Being*, whoſe Nature and Power are *limited*.

*C.* My learned Author thinks differently, " To alledge, ſays he, that the Kingdom of " God has the Dominion over all, and that " the Kingdom of *Satan* is ſubject to it; in- " ſtead of taking away the Difficulty, only " encreaſes it the more"*.

*P.* That the making God *ſupreme*, and Satan *ſubordinate*, ſhould *encreaſe the Difficulty*, looks exceedingly like a Paradox.

*C.* He had before mention'd, " Mens at- " tributing a Kingdom to the *Devil*, that " was able to counterballance the Kingdom " of God and *Chriſt*; as well as a Power, " which exceeded even that of God him- " ſelf"†; and then in the following Sec- on, he very juſtly enquires, —— " How is " it poſſible for God to reign, where the " *Devil* reigns, in the manner Men talk " of"‡?

*P.* This is certainly a very proper Queſtion to ſuch Men. —— For if God's Power and Kingdom be *counterballanced*, nay, even *exceeded* by the Power and Kingdom of the *Devil*; it may very well be aſk'd, —— *How*

* L. 2. c. 18. § 7. † § 6. ‡ Ibid. § 7.

*is it poſſible for God to reign?* This is indeed a very great Difficulty to be got over; but as it only affects thoſe, who maintain it, we are not, in the leaſt, concerned in it.

*C.* But pray obſerve what this Gentleman elſewhere affirms, —— "To maintain, ſays "he, that the *Devil* can do ſuch or ſuch a "Thing, when God permits him; is all one "as to ſay, that God can permit that *Evil* "*Spirit* to become God; or the *Creature* to "become the *Creator*" *.

*P.* The Almighty then cannot give Leave or Power to a created Being to do *ſome certain* Things; but the *Creature* muſt immediately become the *Creator!* Is it poſſible, *Cebes*, to diſcern the Force of this Reaſoning?

*C.* Perhaps he may explain his Meaning in the next Section; where he ſays, that "if "God permits that Evil Being to *create* "and *reform* Nature; how comes it, that he "does not afford him the Glory, of being "adored as *Creator?* And that if by the "Permiſſion of God, he has the Power of "doing that, which is of itſelf ſufficient to "render any one worthy of Adoration, we "can't refuſe him this Honour; nor can God

* L. 2. c. 34. § 18.

" impute it to us as a Sin; ſince he permits " the *Devil* to do that, for which he him- " ſelf would be adored" *.

*P.* As for thoſe, who aſcribe a Power to the Devil, of *creating* and *reforming* Nature; they aſcribe to him a very *extraordinary* Power indeed. But then to be adored *as* Creator, can belong to the Creator *only*; and it would be highly abſurd, as well as impious, to ſay, that God *could* give this to another. —— What Degree of Power indeed, the Almighty may communicate to ſome of his Creatures, we know not; but to talk as if any Degree of delegated Power, entitled even the *Devil* himſelf *to be adored as Creator*; — to ſay that we *could not*, in ſuch Caſe, *refuſe him this Honour*; *and that God could not impute it to us, as a Sin:* —— All this, in my Opinion, is very inconſiderately, and very weakly ſaid,

*C.* But you will allow the Diſtinction he afterwards makes between *Permiſſion* and *Power* †; and allow that a Being may have the former, without the latter. And conſequently, as he reaſons, the *bare Permiſſion* of God does not give the Devil a *Power* to do any Thing.

* Ibid. § 19. † L. 2. c. 34. § 21.

*P.* Bare

*P.* Bare *Leave* or *Permiſſion* does by no means infer *Power*. But ſurely by the Former, a Being may be allow'd to exert that *Power*, which, without *ſuch Permiſſion*, he could not do.

*C.* I cannot help thinking, but he very juſtly obſerves, that "the Divines having re-"courſe to the ſecret Purpoſe or Counſel of "God, for ſolving the Difficulties, which "ariſe from the Power aſcribed to the *Devil*, "is like the *occult Qualities* of ſome Philo-"ſophers, which always ſerved for want of a "better Reaſon. And what, ſays he, is ſtill "worſe, they talk of this ſecret Purpoſe of "God, in relation to that very Thing; the "very Reverſe of which is reveal'd to us in "his Word" *.

*P.* To have recourſe to the *ſecret Will* of God, for ſolving what is contrary to Divine Revelation; ſhews a Man to be very hard drove. But to reſolve the particular Reaſon of ſome Things, which cannot be proved to be contrary to ſuch Revelation, into the wiſe Will of God, is ſurely, my Friend, a very different Thing.

*C.* In my Opinion the ingenious Author gives ſome unanſwerable Reaſons, why Men

* L. 3. c. 16. § 7.

in

in their preſent corrupt State, cannot be liable to the Attacks of *inviſible Beings*.

*P.* Such Arguments may indeed be well worth the hearing.

*C.* " I have thoroughly conſider'd, ſays that " Gentleman, that the State of Man, being " *more perfect* before his Fall, than it is " now, the Body might be acted upon in " ſuch manner, as it is not, at preſent, ſuited " to, or proper for. Something of this, I " have mentioned elſewhere *, in order to " ſhew, that then a Spirit, who had no Body, " might poſſibly act upon the Soul of Man; " and that the Body proving no Obſtacle to " the Operations, ſuch Spirit might perform " juſt what he would. —— However I ſup- " poſe the Evil Spirit was at that Time, as " yet in his primitive State of Perfection, " and that his Fall occaſion'd the Fall of " Man " †.

*P.* The *more perfect* a Creature is, the more, it ſeems, he lies expoſed to the Attacks of another Spirit! This is certainly, *Cebes*, a new Diſcovery in *Metaphyſics!*

*C.* However, is not this a reaſonable Queſtion, —— " Can we believe, ſays he, that " the great Judge of the Univerſe, after hav- " ing releas'd out of Priſon, this curſed Ene-

* L. 2. c. 20. § 27. † L. 3. c. 2. § 5.

" my

" my of Mankind, grants to him *All* that he " demands, that ſo he may perform nothing " but Miracles at his Pleaſure " *.

*P.* What Man, in his Senſes, *ever* believ'd any Thing like it?

*C.* But ſtill, I hope, you will not diſcommend his Zeal, when he frankly declares, that, " if it was poſſible, he would *overturn* the " Works of the *Devil* from *Top to Bottom*, " and not leave one Stone upon another, " which was not demoliſhed †.

*P.* It would indeed, *Cebes*, be a very great Work, *entirely* to overthrow *all the Works of the Devil*; and the learned Author has certainly ſhewn a very *honeſt Zeal* in wiſhing it in his Power.

*C.* And is it not, *Phædo*, the Duty of every wiſe and good Man, not only to wiſh, but to endeavour to deſtroy this *Kingdom of Darkneſs*?

*P.* Moſt certainly.

*C.* Is it not their Duty to root out from amongſt Men, all thoſe wicked Superſtitions, and horrible Notions, which have proceeded from the Belief of ſuch a Being?

*P.* As far as they are able, undoubtedly.

*C.* Can any Thing be more horrible; or

* L. 2. c. 32. § 8. † L. 1. c. 1. § 2.

reflect

reflect more Diſhonour upon God, and Religion, than to ſuppoſe an *Almighty Evil Being*; — an *all-powerful Tyrant*, as ſome have repreſented him; doing all manner of Miſchief at Pleaſure, without Check or Controul?

*P.* Nothing ſurely can be more horrible or ſhocking.

*C.* "It is the common Opinion, ſays my "learned Author, that this Being can teach "Mankind the greateſt Myſteries of Faith. "— Thus the Faith is weak'ned, and the "Fear of God is baniſh'd"*. And moreover Men are led to fancy, that they are "not chargeable with their own Crimes"†. Can any Thing now be conceiv'd worſe, than ſuch a Belief, which is big with ſuch horrible Conſequences?

*P.* Nothing, ſurely.

*C.* Such monſtrous Notions then, ought to be rooted out.

*P.* Moſt certainly.

*C.* By what Method, *Phædo*?

*P.* By convincing Men, that ſuch Opinions are *impious* and *irrational*.

*C.* Would it not be a much more effectual Method to this Purpoſe, if we could con-

* L. 2. c. 35. § 12. † C. 36. § 11, 12, 18.

vince

vince them that there was *no* ſuch Being at all? For if this could once be done; all the wicked Conſequences of ſuch a Belief, muſt entirely ceaſe of Courſe: and which this good Man has largely demonſtrated to be deſtructive of all true Piety and Religion *.

*P.* It is true, *Cebes*, that Men could not be ſaid to frame a *wrong* Belief, where they had really *no* Belief at all. Nor could they draw *bad* Conſequences, where they had *no* Principle to draw them from. —— But as falſe Conſequences are not an Argument againſt the Truth of any Thing: ſo I really cannot ſee, why, to avoid one extream, a wiſe Man ſhould run into another. —— I am inclined to believe that the Truth may lye between; and that the moſt rational Courſe would certainly be, to correct all wrong Opinions concerning that Being; and to eſtabliſh only ſuch, as are agreeable to *right Reaſon*, and the *true* Senſe of *Revelation:* and ſuch ſurely can never be deſtructive either of *true* Piety, or *true* Religion.

*C.* I humbly apprehend that *right* Opinions can never take Place, till *every* Opinion, which favours the Reality or Power of ſuch a Being, be loſt from amongſt Men. — If

* L. 2. c. 35, and 36. L. 3. c. 21.

this could ever be brought about, Mens Opinions might then correſpond with ſound Reaſon, and Scripture rightly underſtood; but, I am afraid, never till then. And tho' the diſbelieving there is any ſuch Being, may be call'd an *Extream*; yet if it ſhall appear to have Reaſon on its Side, the bare Name will be of little Importance.

For tho' I have been arguing upon the Suppoſition of the Reality of ſuch a Being, and have only conſidered the fatal Conſequences ariſing from hence; yet I think, I have an Argument or two, which will nearly demonſtrate his *Non-Exiſtence*. I am ſenſible, that the learned Writer, I have ſo often quoted, proceeds upon the Suppoſition of a *Devil*, who is *reſtrain'd* by God Almighty from doing the leaſt Miſchief. This he calls "*the Foundation, upon which his Building* "*principally reſts*"*. However, if I am not greatly deceiv'd, I hope to make it appear, that that ingenious Gentleman allow'd more, than he need to have done.

*P.* Why really, though you ſeem to undertake the more difficult Taſk of the two; yet one would think, there was very little difference, (with regard to the chief Point in

* L. 2. c. 9. § 11. See alſo § 1. and c. 8. § 5.

Con-

Controverſy) between a mere *Non-Entity*, and *ſuch* a Being, as has not the *leaſt* Power to do any Thing. However, I beg you would propoſe your Arguments.

*C.* You will allow that that *Idea* can have no Foundation in Nature, which is expreſly contradictory to the Being of a God, or any of his Divine Attributes?

*P.* Moſt certainly.

*C.* But I ſay, that the *Idea* of a Devil, is ſuch an *Idea*.

*P.* This, my Friend, wants a little Proof.

*C.* Do you doubt, whether the Belief, of a Being endued with *thoſe Powers*, which are ſometimes aſcribed to him, be contrary to the Divine Attributes?

*P.* But what follows from hence?

*C.* Does it not neceſſarily follow, that there can be no *ſuch inviſible* Monarch, as this is ſuppoſed to be?

*P.* Your Argument concludes very ſtrongly, *Cebes*, againſt all thoſe, who are for ſetting up either *a ſelf-exiſtent*, *omnipotent*, or *independent* Evil Principle: —— But does not affect ſuch, as allow not the Devil any Power or Quality, *inconſiſtent* with one *ſingle Attribute* of God.

*C.* You allow this evil Being to have Power; —— and that the *Creator* foreſaw,

when he form'd him, and gave him this Power, what Uſe he would make of it?

*P.* Undoubtedly.

*C.* Do we then conſult for the Honour of God, when we affirm he created ſuch a *Monſter* to reſiſt him; and who, at beſt, muſt be quite uſeleſs? This is ſurely, to ſpeak the ſofteſt of it, to *create in vain*; which is very inconſiſtent with all our *Ideas* of an *All-wiſe* Being.

*P.* That an *All-wiſe* Being can do nothing *in vain*, is readily granted. But ſurely it does not follow, that every Thing is *in vain*, the Reaſon or Uſe of which, we are not able to diſcover. For certainly the Uſefulneſs or Neceſſity of any Thing cannot depend on our *Ignorance* or *Knowledge*. —— An honeſt Huſbandman, who finds his Barns deſtroy'd by the Lightning, and his Corn by the Hail, is perhaps at a great Loſs for the *Reaſon*, or *Neceſſity* of either. And even ſuppoſing the whole World to be as ignorant as this Man; yet there would be juſt the *ſame Reaſons* for theſe Things, as there are at preſent. —— As to the other Part of your Objection, it is indeed, by no means, conſulting for the Honour of God, to imagine he ever created *any* Being, *with a Deſign* that ſuch Being ſhould *reſiſt* him. But where is the inconſiſtency, that

that an infinitely wiſe and good God ſhould create *innumerable* Beings, endued with *Freedom*; and conſequently *capable* of abuſing that Freedom? ——— Is not this evidently the Caſe of Mankind? Did not the Almighty foreſee what uſe they would make of their *Liberty?* Or is it any reflection on his Goodneſs, or Wiſdom, that, foreſeeing they would pervert it, he yet put it in their Power to do it? If this be no Reflection on thoſe Attributes, how comes it to be any, in the Caſe of other Beings? You muſt either maintain, that it is really thus, in the former Inſtance; or elſe allow that it is not ſo, in the latter. They evidently both ſtand upon the ſame Foundation; and muſt therefore either ſtand or fall together. Beſides, dont we daily experience variety of Temptations from the World, and our own Hearts?

*C.* Moſt certainly.

*P.* Do theſe any way impeach either the Wiſdom or Goodneſs of God?

*C.* By no means.

*P.* To quarrel with theſe, you think would be to quarrel with the preſent Frame and Conſtitution of Nature?

*C.* Moſt certainly.

*P.* Then you have no manner of Objection

to Mens undergoing *ſome* Temptations in this Life?

*C.* No objection at all.

*P.* It is the *Number* then, that gives Offence?

*C.* Not without Reaſon.

*P.* What may that Reaſon be?

*C.* Let us put the Caſe, that a Man has been tempted twenty Times, to the Commiſſion of one particular Sin; and that half theſe Temptations proceeded from this *Evil Being:* Has not the Man, upon this Suppoſition, ſuffer'd juſt as much more, as he would have done, had there been no ſuch *Tempter?*

*P.* Shall we ſay, that the Man, who has had ten fits of the Stone, and as many of the Gout, has ſuffer'd juſt twenty Times more, than he would have done, had there been none of theſe Diſorders?

*C.* Why not?

*P.* But is here any thing to find fault with?

*C.* Not in the leaſt. But then pray obſerve, that the Danger ariſing from the ſevereſt Diſtemper is not to be compared with that, which we ſuppoſe muſt ariſe from ſo *dreadful* a Being: and therefore the *Nature*, as well as *Number* of our Sufferings, are to be conſider'd.

*P.* Surely,

to exerciſe his Power, but in *ſubordination* to the wiſe Will of God, and conſiſtently with the *Freedom* of Man: ſo long, I think, there can lye no *reaſonable* Objection againſt any one Attribute of the Almighty.

*C.* Though I cannot be reconciled to the Thoughts of ſuch a Being; yet this ſhall not hinder me from reconſidering the whole Affair, with Coolneſs and Attention.

But as no other Objections occur to me, at preſent, I ſhall at this Time, trouble you no further. —— Adieu therefore, my good Friend, *Phædo.*

*P.* Dear *Cebes*, adieu.

*FINIS.*

MVSEVM
BRITAN
NICVM

*Lately publiſh'd by the ſame* AUTHOR,

A *Vindication* of Mr. *Locke*, from the *Charge* of giving Encouragement to *Scepticiſm* and *Infidelity*, and from ſeveral other Miſtakes and Objections of the learned Author of the *Procedure*, *Extent*, and *Limits* of *Human Underſtanding*. In Six Dialogues. Wherein is likewiſe enquired, Whether Mr. *Locke*'s true Opinion of the Soul's *Immateriality* was not miſtaken by the late learned Monſ. *Leibnitz*. Printed for *J.* and *P. Knapton*, at the *Bible* and *Crown* in *Ludgate-Street*.

A Second *Vindication* of Mr. *Locke*, wherein his Sentiments relating to *Perſonal Identity*, are cleared up from ſome Miſtakes of the Right Rev. Dr. *Butler*, now Lord Biſhop of *Briſtol*, in his Diſſertation on that Subject. And the various Objections rais'd againſt Mr. *Locke*, by the learned Author of *An Enquiry into the Nature of the Human Soul*, are conſider'd. To which are added, *Reflections* on ſome Paſſages of Dr. *Watts*'s *Philoſophical Eſſays*. Printed for *Fletcher Gyles*, againſt *Gray*'s-*Inn* in *Holbourn*, and ſold by *J. Roberts* in *Warwick-Lane*, *R. Clements* at *Oxford*, and *W. Thurlbourn* at *Cambridge*.

*P.* Surely, *Cebes*, you would not offer to ſay, that though you can readily ſubmit the *Number* of the *leſs* dangerous Trials, to infinite Wiſdom; yet as to thoſe, which you conceive to be *more* hazardous, you deſire to fix and limit the *Number* yourſelf! Certainly, my Friend, you would not be underſtood to reaſon thus; and yet this appears to be the very Drift of your laſt Argument.

*C.* But yet theſe *ſupernumerary* Temptations appear to me ſo very grievous, that if there was really ſuch a Being, I ſhould think his Power would be ſoon deſtroy'd by an All-wiſe and perfectly good God.

*P.* Well, let us reſume the Objection, and ſuppoſe, as you have put the Caſe, that half the Man's Temptations was owing entirely to *this Being*; and conſequently that without him, the Man had eſcaped them; — yet unleſs it can appear, that the Man was tempted ſo many ſeveral Times oftner, than was really conſiſtent with the Nature of his State and Condition in this World; and with God's one great and uniform Deſign in the Government and Diſpoſition of the whole; —— it is impoſſible to ſee, how theſe additional Temptations do in the leaſt affect either the Wiſdom or Goodneſs of the Deity. One would really think, that the *Number* and *Nature* of our Tryals,

Tryals, ought in reaſon, to be left to him, who is intimately acquainted with our Make and Frame; and who underſtands our different Wants and Capacities, much better than we do ourſelves.

There is ſurely no doubt to be made, but God Almighty could eaſily prevent this *Evil Being*, or any other, from injuring the leaſt Part of the Creation; yet who can ſay, but this might be breaking in upon that great and wiſe Scheme of Providence, which the Almighty has ſeen proper to fix *? —— We cannot certainly pretend to ſay, but this might be deſtructive of that exact Order and Connection of Things, which are altogether worthy of the Wiſdom of God. As we are, my Friend, but Creatures of *Yeſterday*, what wonder is it, if we cannot thoroughly fathom the Reaſons of all the Ways of God? Could theſe be perfectly known, there is no doubt, but we ſhould diſcern as much Beauty and Harmony in thoſe very Diſpenſations of Providence, which may appear to ſome, inconſiſtent with Wiſdom and Goodneſs; as we now do, in reſpect of the moſt regular and delightful Parts of the Univerſe. —— In ſhort, as long as this *Being* is not ſuppoſed

* See the Preface of Dr. *Burnet* to his Book, *De Fide & officiis Chriſtianorum*, p. 21, 22.

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